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MONOPSONY IN MANPOWER: ORGANIZED BASEBALL
MEETS THE ANTITRUST LAWS*
FOR over sixty years professional baseball clubs have disregarded with im-
punity the mandate of the Sherman Act I that "competition, not combination
should be the law of trade. ' 2 By agreeing not to compete for players' ;ervices
and by blacklisting those players who turn to higher bidders, a combinatio,, of
335 clubs, known as "organized baseball," has attained a monopsony, or "buyer's
monopoly," 3 over the market for skilled baseball talent. Use of this monopsony
leverage has enabled the combination to regulate player salaries, exclude
*The scope of this Comment is limited to restraints on competition in the purchase
of baseball players' services and the selling of professional baseball exhibitions. Because
of space limitations, the industry's antitrust problems regarding radio and television will
not here be discussed. At the behest of the Department of Justice, the major leagues
rescinded agreements restricting competition in the sale of radio and television rights,
October 8, 1951. Hearings before Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Serial No. 1, Part 6, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1951) (hereinafter cited as HMAIUNGs), 1177-9. Organized baseball is, how-
ever, watching the pending government antitrust suit against professional football's
television restraints, United States v. National Football League, No. 12808, E.D. Pa.,
with more than casual interest. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1953, p. 30, col. 1.
The problems created by unrestricted competition in the purchase of players' services
appear to be common to all professional team sports. Clubs in professional football,
professional basketball, and professional hockey have all patterned their practices in this
market after organized baseball. HEARINGS, 1454-71, 1504-5; Topkis, Monopoly in Pro-
fessional Sports, 58 YALE L.J. 691, 695-705 (1949). Even British Association Football
(soccer), with a totally different heritage from American professional team sports, has
evolved trade agreements foreclosing competition for players' services. See MINIsTY
OF LABOUR AND NATIONAL SERvicE, REPORT OF A COMMITTEE OF IMVESTIGATIOX INTO A
DIFFERENcE REGARDING THE TERMs AND CONDITIONS OF AssoCIATION FooTALL PLAYnts
(1952).
The article by Topkis represents the severest indictment of the "baseball trust."
The leading defense of organized baseball is Eckler, Baseball-Sport or Connerce?, 17
U. OF CHi. L. REV. 56 (1949). See also Neville, Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 10
FoRD L. REv. 208 (1947) ; and Notes, 53 COL. L. REv. 243 (1953), 5 INTRAMURAL L, Rrv,
(N.Y.U.) 206 (1950), 24 NOTRE DAME LAw. 372 (1949), 32 VA. L. RL-v. 1164 (194b),
46 YALE L.J. 1386 (1937). On baseball player contracts generally, see The Law of Base
ball, 113 N.Y.L.J. 1832, 1848, 1864, 1880 (1945); Johnson, Baseball and the Law, 73
U.S.L. REv. 252 (1939) ; Stratton, Baseball Jurisprudence, 44 Am. L. RIv. 374 (1910).
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1946).
2. Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941); National Cotton
Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 129 (1905). See also Northern Securities Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197, 331 (1904).
3. "Monopoly" literally means one seller, or a number of sellers acting in unison,
in a particular market. "Monopsony" was coined by economists twenty years ago to
describe the reverse situation, when a single buyer or a number of buyers acting in
unison control the entire demand for a service or commodity, or enough of it to augment
profits by restricting the amount purchased or by reducing the price paid. Wicox,
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competitors, and divide consumer markets among the member clubs. Today
organized baseball is undisputed master over the entire profes ional sport
wherever it is played in North America.
Organized baseball's dominion has seldom been challenged in the courts.4
In 1922- the Supreme Court immunized the industry from antitrust attack
when Justice Holmes declared in the Federal Baseball case that the businesh
of exhibiting baseball games was not interstate commerce and hence not sub-
ject to the Sherman Act.5 However, in the past four years, organized base-
ball's privileged position has been severely jolted, both in the courts and in
Congress. Treble damage actions by three blacklisted players in 1949
threatened to undermine the Federal flascball case, on the basis of a concept
CosrTioX AND M-OO0POLY INr Akmac, x IxNtsrv 9-11 (TNEC Monograph 21,
1940).
"Mlonopoly," as the term is employed in the Sherman Act, is defined co as to include
control over either the buyers' or sellers' side of the market. Mandeville Island Farms,
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 2,36 (194S); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51-61 (1910). "Trade necessarily involves both buying and
selling and the control and domination of either monopolizes trade." 'Yontrose Lumb2r
Co. v. United States, 124 F.2d 573, 578 (10th Cir. 1941). See also Hood Rubber Co. v.
United States Rubber Co., 229 Fed. 583, 5S7, 538q (D. Mass. 1916). Because monopoly
also means merely control over supply and the commonest manifestation of markt domi-
nation is the power of sellers to raise price, there have been loose dicta in a few antitrust
cases which might be interpreted to mean that monopoly qua monopoly is the only evil
which the Sherman Act wLas intended to reach. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S.
469, 50-01 (1940). This overlooks the fact that monopsony power exercised by a buyer
to suppress the prices of goods and services causes as much public harm as monopoly
power. It would be anomalous to assert that the benefits of free competition are for buyers
only. Fortunately, actual holdings by the Supreme Court indicate that Monopzonistic
restraints on competition are as illegal as monopolistic ones. See, e.g., Swiit & Co. v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); Eastern States Rutail Lumber Ass'n v. United Stateo,
234 U.S. 600 (1914); Anderson v. Shipowners' Ass'n of Pacific Coast, 272 U.S. 359
(1926); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (194 ); Schine Chain Theatres v. United
States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); 'andeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar
Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948); United States v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F.2d
79 (7th Cir. 1949). The use of the economists' term, "monopsony," to describe "buyer's
monopolies," it is suggested, might help clarify analysis of two quite different market
phenomena. For this reason, this Comment will attempt to use both terms according to
their proper economic meaning.
4. Prior to Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949), only t vo antitrust
actions had been brought against organized baseball. The first, Federal League of Profes-
sional Baseball Clubs v. National League, No. 373, N.D. Ill. (1915), w.-as settled out
of court. H.R. REP. 2002, 82d Cong.. 2d Sess. 56-7 (1952) (hereinafter cited as Housu
REvozr). The second, Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League, %vent
to the Supreme Court. 259 U.S. 20 (1922), affirming 2o9 Fed. (ji (D.C. Cir. 1920).
The Department of Justice twice refused to bring suit under the Sherman Act on
behalf of the Government. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1916, p. 12, col. 1; N.Y. Times, April
15, 1937, p. 25, col. 2.
5. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922),
affirming 269 Fed. 681 (D.C. Cir., 1920) ; noted in 34 H.%rv. L. REv. 559 (1921).
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of commerce which the Supreme Court had radically changed since 1922.0
Out-of-court settlements temporarily averted the showdown, 7 but once again
the combination is plagued with antitrust suits by dissident players and club
owners.
8
This renewed litigation prompted the House Antitrust Subcommittee to
investigate the sport.9 Public guardians of free competition and private ad-
mirers of the national pastime, the Subcommittee hoped to find means of
softening the clash between the Sherman Act and the industry's long-estab-
lished trade practices. Spokesmen for organized baseball urged complete
exemption equivalent to that established by judicial fiat in 1922.10 But the
6. The leading case was Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949),
reversing 79 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), which ruled, on a motion ,to dismiss, that
Gardella, a blacklisted "reserve jumper," stated a cause of action for treble damages
under the Sherman Act. See also Gardella v. Chandler, 174 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1949),
affirming CCH TRAE CAs. ff 62,412 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (injunction pendentle life ordering
reinstatement denied). The other two actions were by "contract jumpers," Max Lanier
and Fred Martin of the St. Louis Cardinals. See Martin v. National League, 174 F.2d
917 (2d Cir. 1949), affirmning Martin v. Chandler, CCH TRADE, CAS. ff 62,397 (S.D.NX.Y,
1949); Martin v. Chandler, 85 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). The Gardella case is
noted in 18 U. OF CIN. L. Rxv. 203 (1949), 34 IOWA L. Rzv. 545 (1949), 33 MINN. L.
Ray. 428 (1949), 37 GEo. L.J. 618 (1949), 62 HARv. L. REV. 1240 (1949), 28 Nan. L.
Ray. 616 (1949), 47 MICH. L. Rzv. 1214 (1949), 20 TENN. L. REv. 770 (1949), and 44
ILL L. REv. 493 (1949).
7. After three trips to the court of appeals, organized baseball settled with all three
players. HousE REPORT, 84. The amount of the settlements was not made public. How-
ever, it is known that the legal and litigation expenses of the Commissioner, American
League, and National League amounted to $55,550 in 1948, $337,600 in 1949, and $93,400
in 1950, indicating that the burden of these cases on organized baseball was not insubstantial.
HEARINGS, 332, 335, 1336, 1338, 1339, 1427. Senator A. B. Chandler, former Commissioner
of Baseball, testified to the Antitrust Subcommittee: "I do not think the lawyers thought
we could win the Gardella case." HEARINGS, 290.
8. See notes 163-5 infra.
9. N.Y. Times, May 5, 1951, p. 21, col. 6; N.Y. Times, May 11, 1951, p. 34, col. 2;
Washington Star, May 20, 1951, pp. 1, 5. See also opening statement of Rep. Celler
(N.Y.), Chairman of the Subcommittee. HEAmNGS, 1-4. Originally known as the Sub-
committee on the Study of Monopoly Power, the Subcommittee was renamed the Antitrust
Subcommittee during the reorganization of the House Judiciary Committee in 1952.
Similar Congressional investigations had been proposed in prior years. In 1913 Rep,
Gallagher (Ill.) introduced a resolution to investigate the "Baseball Trust." H. Rzs.
64, 63d Cong., 1st Sess., 50 CONG. REc. 323; and in 1937 Rep. Ray Cannon (Wis.)
proposed an investigation of the "existing baseball monopoly." H. REs. 204, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess., 81 CONG. Rm. 4186. Both resolutions died in the Rules Committee.
10. Senator Edwin Johnson (Colo.), president of the Western League, sounded the
call to arms in a syndicated newspaper article, in which he said: "Player contracts, in-
cluding the much-misunderstood reserve clause, can be and must be legalized. . . . It is
getting so that every little pipsqueak troublemaker and every disgruntled ballplayer
nowadays attacks the reserve clause to lend support to his pet peeve. These annoyers
are quick to indulge in legal blackmail to extract cash and other valuable consideration
from the game which do not rightfully belong to them." N.Y. Times, April 22, 1951,
§ 5, p. 5, col. 6 (city edition). But, compare Johnson's remarks made two years later,
(Vol. 62: 576
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committee, not satisfied that organized baseball merited the broad immunity
it desired, passed back to the courts the burden of resolving the conflict be-
tween the national policy of economic competition and the intricate pattern
of restrictive practices which constitute the present economic basis of profes-
sional baseball."
Organized baseball relies on three lines of defense to preserve its existing
hegemony. If possible it hopes to prevail in the jurisdictional argument
founded on the Federal Baseball decision.'- Failing this, it asserts that mo-
nopsonistic restraints in the personal service market are not within the pro-
hibition of the Sherman Act.13 And, finally, it claims its restrictions are
reasonable in the light of the peculiar economic conditions prevailing in pro-
fessional sports.14 The extensive hearings and detailed report of the House
Antitrust Subcommittee provide for the first time an adequate factual basis
for evaluating these legal defenses and for exploring possibilities of remedial
action.' 5
infra note 269. On May 23, 1951, three identical bills, H.R. 4229, 4230, and 4231, were
introduced in the House of Representatives, which would totally exempt all "organized
professional sports enterprises" from the antitrust bills. 97 Co.I.. RIC. 5763 (1951).
Senator Johnson himself introduced a similar bill, S. 1526, in the Senate. 97 Co:x. RIIr.
5663 (1951). Rep. Herlong (Fla.), proponent of one of the three House bills, formerly
was president of the Florida State League in organized baseball. Hn.MUNns, 443.
11. HousE RFPmOTr, 228-32. Quipped sports columnist Red Smith: "After ten long
arduous months, the status has tottered triumphantly back to quo." N.Y. Herald Tribune,
May 23, 1952, p. 20, col. 5.
12. Brief for Appellees, pp. 10-42, Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 200 F2d 193
(9th Cir. 1952); Brief for Appellees, pp. 10-35, Corbett v. Chandler, 6th Cir., Feb. 20,
1953; Brief for Appellees, pp. 14-32, Kowalski v. Chandler, 6th Cr., Feb. 20, 1953.
13. Brief for Appellees, pp. 43-63, Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 200 F.2d 193
(9th Cir. 1952); Brief for Appellees, pp. 35-9, Corbett v. Chandler, 6th Cir., Feb. 20,
1953 Brief for Appellees, pp. 21-6, 39-47, 6th Cir., Feb. 20, 1953.
14. "Organized baseball, represented by eminent counsel, has assured the subcom-
mittee that the legality of the reserve clause will be tested by the rule of reason." HousE
REP , 231. See also testimony of Commissioner Frick, Hn.,'xxas, 34; Eclder, Baseball
-Sport or Commerce?, 17 U. oF Cm. L. RPv. 56, 63-71 (1949).
15. The 1643-page committee hearings represents the most exhaustive source of
information on organized baseball's operations, and its 232-page report the most thorough
analysis of the combination's trade practices.
Prior to the congressional investigation of organized baseball, few sources on the
history and economics of the trade combination were available. The most detailed works
were student theses. See CrAIG, OrGANizED BASEBALL: AN INmusaRY STuDv oCy A $100
AfmnIoN SpEcrATOR SPoaR (unpublished thesis in Oberlin College Library, 1950); and
AR s oNG, THE UNIONIZATION OF BASEBAL. (unpublished thesis in Princeton University
Library, 1947). Of the many popularized histories of organized baseball, the most useful
are: Lim, BASEBALL STORY (1950); ALLEN, 100 YRAS OF BAsnAL (1950); P. M.
Smrr, BASEBALL (1947) ; RIcGHTER, HISTORY AND REcoRDs OF BASEBAL (1914) ; SPALD-
ING, A-umcA's NATIONAL GAmE (1911); and PALuE_, ATnLuUc SaonTs In AnXc&
(1889). For collections of club and player statistics, see TuRmN,: aum Tuompsozn,
OFFICIAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL (1951); and LANIGAN, BAsDA. Cyc.opzveA
19531
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ORGANIZATION AND ECONOMIC PRACTICES OF ORGANIZED BASEBALL
Professional baseball ranks high in public favor among spectator amusement
industries. In 1950, 52 million persons 10 paid 68 million dollars 17 to watch
382 clubs "8 in organized basball play 30,000 games. Gross sales for these
clubs reached 82 million dollars, including 54 million net gate receipts, 20
million from concession sales, and 4 million from radio and television.19 The
54 million dollars realized by the industry-wide combination at the box office
exceeded all other professional team sports combined. 20 The combination
employed 8,000 professional players,21 who were paid between $80 and $16,000
a month for their 8ervices. 22
But professional baseball is more than a business; it is also a sport. Unlike
firms in other industries, a professional sport enterprise must cooperate with
chosen competitors in order to create a marketable product. Because the
attractiveness of each product or exhibition depends on its uncertainty and
dramatic value, this cooperation must extend beyond the mere performance
of the exhibition to the creation of common trade practices which promote
equality of playing skill among opposing clubs. Furthermore, in the base-
ball industry the sole incentive for business decisions is not the profit motive.
Many club owners look upon their investments as a diverting, and sometimes
costly, hobby. The rewards they seek are not profits but pennants, pleasure,
and prestige.23
(1922). On current matters in organized baseball, see the trade newspaper, The Sporting
News, published weekly, and its annual record books: THE BASEBALL RzoISTmn (statistics
on major league players' careers) and the OFFICIAL BASEBALL GUIDE (club and player
records). The trade regulations of organized baseball appear in the BASEBALL BLUE Boott,
published annually by the Heilbroner Baseball Bureau, at Ft. Wayne, Ind.
16. HEAINGS, 1616. Paid attendance in organized baseball rose from a low of
12,600,000 in 1933 to an all-time peak of 62,380,000 in 1949. Since that time there has
been a steady recession, due perhaps to the inroads of television and the loss of player
talent to the armed forces. In 1952 paid attendance was 40,300,000. NATIONAL Ass'll ov
PROF'L BASEBALL LEAGUES, 1952 HIGHLIGHTS 1-2 (1952) ; Sporting News, Dec. 17, 1952,
p. 13, col. 3; 1953 WORLD ALMANAC 806, 809.
17. HOUSE REPORT, 86. The estimate used includes 20 percent federal excise tax
and miscellaneous state and local excise taxes.
18. Id. at 12.
19. Id. at 86.
20. DEP'T OF CoMaiacE, NATIONAL INCOME SUPPLEMENT TO SURVEY OF CURRENT
BUSINESS 197 (1951) ; HEARINGS, 963.
21. HOUSE REPORT, 12-13.
22. HEARINGS, 965. The salary figures are for 1951, but they probably approximate
1950 levels. The highest player salary was $90,000 for a 52 month playing season, a
stipend received by both Joe DiMaggio and Ted Williams. See N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct,
23, 1951, p. 30, col. 6.
23. This is not to say that professional baseball may not be a lucrative investment
for some. Net profits for the sixteen major league clubs combined averaged four
million dollars (thirteen percent of gross sales) annually from 1946 to 1949. HFAINtss,




Professional baseball was still a toddling infant when its promoters dis-
covered that the sport was most successful when clubs were associated in
leagues. To meet monthly payrolls, club owners sought assurances of a mini-
mum number of games. In addition, they discovered that established rivalries
with other clubs for the pursuit of mythical "championships" enhanced daily
attendance. As a consequence, clubs affiliated into voluntary unincorporated
associations or "leagues" with prearranged playing schedules, and awarded a
pennant to each season's champion.2 4 Through trial and error, eight clubs
were found to be the most workable size for a league. More clubs left too many
members out of the running for the pennant, and fewer produced monotony
of opposition.25
Dominating organized baseball are sixteen "major league" clubs, equally
divided between the American and National leagues. In 1950 they realized
almost half of the industry's 82 million dollars worth of sales? ° The eight
members of each league are parties to a league constitution which prescribes
the methods for drawing up the playing schedule, transferring players, and
dividing gate receipts. 27  The American and National leagues, in turn, are
allied under the Major League Agreement and Major League Rules, which
establish the office of Commissioner of Baseball and further regulate the mem-
ber dubs' activities, particularly as to the acquisition and control of players.23
Representatives of the 16 dubs meet periodically to amend their league con-
stitutions, the Major League Agreement, and the Major League Rules.3
out of 2,287 officers and directors of minor league clubs, in 1951 depended on baseball
for a living. HousE REpoR-T, 91. The New York Yankees, the most profitable enterprise
in the industry, has distributed only eght percent of its profits to its owners since 1920,
and Tom Yawkey, owner of the Boston Red Sox since 1933, has lost $12,00,G00 on his
baseball investment. HL~uxxos, 1599-1601. See also Horsy RnrorsT, 92-7; HuEAPGs,
1516-30, 1625, 1629-35.
24. Housn, REozr, 17-20; HEARINGs, 1509-14.
25. The National League, organized in 1876, had six members in 1877 and 1878,
tvelve members from 1892 to 1899. In neither period were the playing seasons profitable.
HOUSE REPoRr, 20, 37. Eight clubs per league have been the standard throughout organized
baseball since 1900. In 1952 all thirty-one of the minor leagues commencing the season
with eight clubs finished intact. Two of the eleven leagues starting vith six clubs and
the one league which started with ten clubs lost one or more of their members before
the season ended. NATIOxAL AssocmATioi OF PnorassoN, BA_SEBA LEAGuEs, 1952
HIGHLIGHTS pa$sim (1952).
26. HousE RE:PoRT, 86.
27. HEARINGS, 1095-1111 (National League Constitution) ; 1111-21 (American League
Constitution); 1406-10 (American League reorganization agreement, 1934).
28. HEARINGs, 1121-5 (Major League Agreement, 1946); 1125-54 (Major League
Rules); 1176-9, 1186-7 (October and December, 1951, amendments to Major League
Rules).
29. National League Constitution, §§ 60, 6S, HZ.L :ns, 1109, 1111; American League
Constitution, arts. IX, XVI, HEARINGs, 1115, 1116; Major League Agreement, art. V,
HEAINGS, 1124; Major League Rule 27, HAFRImNGs, 1148.
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Between such meetings, major league affairs are supervised by elected league
officers and the Commissioner with the aid of the Excutive Council, a quasi-
board of directors composed of four major league club presidents.8 0
Forty-three "minor leagues," graded in seven classifications 81 according
to the size of their consumer markets, 2 are parties to the National Associa-
tion Agreement. 8. These leagues include 319 clubs located in forty-four dif-
ferent states and three foreign countries.34 Binding the major and minor
leagues together is the Major-Minor League Agreement with appended rules.83
By this agreement the minor leagues accept the jurisdiction of the Com-
missioner as final arbiter of all disputes and agree to uniform procedures re-
garding the making and transfer of player contracts.
Minor leagues sought and gained admission to organized baseball because
of the mutual benefit derived from the combination's agreement not to compete
for players' services. Because admission depended on the recognition of exist-
ing members' local market monopolies, new minor leagues tended to stake
their franchises in the largest cities not then represented in organized baseball.
Hence the older leagues not only tend to be located in the more populous
markets, but also possess the higher classifications in the combination's hier-
archy 36 with resultant priorities in the market for player contracts.8 1
30. National League Constitution, §§ 15-31, HARuNGS, 1098-1101; American League
Constitution, arts. VI-VIII, HEARINGS, 1113-5; Major League Agreement, arts. I, II,
HhAsNGs, 1121-4; Major League Rules 26, HAmINGS, 1147-8.
31. A complete directory of minor leagues, clubs, and executives is published annually
in HELRONER BASEDA.L BUREAU, BAsFALL. BL E BooK. In 1952 there was one league
(Pacific Coast League) in the "Open" classification at the top of the minor league
hierarchy; two leagues in "AAA"; two in "AA"; four in "A"; eight in "B"; eleven in
"C"; and fifteen in "D."
32. National Association Agreement, § 10.02(b), HEARIN6s, 1195.
33. HEARImNGS, 1182-5, 1187-1247.
34. 324 minor league clubs were in business at the start of the 1952 playing season,
Sporting News, April 16, 1952, pp. 28-29; but five small clubs in the Class D leagues
were unable to complete their schedule commitments. NATiONAL Associ=oN o Pito -
SIONAL BASEBALL LEAGuES, 1952 HIGHLIGHTS passim (1952). The foreign countries repre-
sented in organized baseball are Canada, Cuba, and Mexico.
35. HFuruGS, 1154-7 (Major-Minor League Agreement, 1946); 1157-76 (Major-
Minor League Rules) ; 1177, 1179-80 (1951-52 amendments to Major-Minor League Agree-
ment) ; 1177, 1180-2 (1951-52 amendments to Major-Minor League Rules). The 1951-52
amendments pertained to the creation of a new "Open" classification for the Pacific Coast
League, which long has aspired to major league status. Sporting News, Nov. 7, 1951, p. 2,
col. 1; Nov. 21, 1951, p. 13, col. 1.
36. Boston and Chicago were charter members of the National League when it was
first organized in 1876. The present New York and Philadelphia clubs joined in 1883,
Pittsburgh in 1887 (after five years in the old American Association), Cincinnati in 1890
(after eight years in the old A.A.), Brooklyn in 1890 (after six years in the old A.A.),
and St. Louis in 1892 (after ten years in the old A.A.). TuImUN & TuoM,'soN, OFrnciA,
BAsEBAu. ENcYcLoPEDIA 402-05 (1951). The American League, which dates back to
1886 as a minor league, forced its way to major league status in 1901-03, retaining one
old member (Detroit), placing five clubs in cities occupied by the National League
[Vol. 62:576
MONOPSONY IN MANPOWER
Although allegedly independent from the major leagues, the minor leagues
are largely controlled by their big league brothers. More than half of the
minor league clubs are either direct subsidiaries to major league corporations
or affiliated through "working agreements." 38 Major league "farm directors"
commonly instruct these minor league affiliates how to vote at their annual
National Association meetings.39
Also associated with the National Association are four "unclassified affili-
ates"-winter leagues in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, and Venezuela.40 The
only independent professional leagues in North America which are not parties
to the Major-Minor League Agreement are the Negro American League,
the Mexican League, the Mexican Pacific Coast League, and the Veracruz
Winter League. The first two have understandings with organized baseball
not to compete for its players in return for similar hands-off guarantees; 4
and the others are remote winter leagues which as yet have offered little threat
to organized baseball's restrictive trade practices.
Governing this combination of professional baseball clubs are the club presi-
dents, who determine the industry's trade practices; forty-five league presidents,
who administer league affairs at the sufferance of the club owners; and the
Commissioner of Baseball and the President of the National Association, who
handle inter-league affairs. Ford C. Frick, the present Commissioner,
possesses broad investigative and judicial power. He is authorized to investi-
gate any acts or practices "alleged or suspected to be detrimental to the best
interests of the national game of baseball" and to determine what "preventive,
(Boston, Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, and St. Louis), and invading two cities
which had been abandoned by the National League when it cut its circuit from twelve
clubs to eight in 1900 (Cleveland and Washington). Id. at 395-6. Of the five largest
minor leagues (Class "AA" and higher), the International League (occupying secondary
cities in the northeast and the two largest Canadian cities) dates back to 184, the
Southern Association to 1885, the Texas League to 18, the American Association
(occupying secondary cities in the mid-west) to 1902, and the Pacific Coast League to
1903. All other minor leagues presently operating entered the combination since World
War L DmEciory OF MIN0R LE.AGuE CLUBS AND LrAGUES (unpublished, Sporting News,
1949).
37. See page 595 infra.
38. HoUsE. REnoar, 183; Sporting News, April 16, 1952, pp. 23-9.
39. HYa.UUGs, 76S-9.
40. HoUsE REPORT, 81; HEAmNGS, 233-9.
41. Housa REPoar, 82, 85; HE-FINGS, 1295, 154S-50. The Negro American League
reduced its membership from eight clubs to six in 1952, Sporting News, Jan. 9, 1952,
p. 19, col. 4, and the Mexican League also operated with six clubs. Sporting News, Oct.
8, 1952, p. 29, col. 3. The Mexican League apparently wishes to keep its nominal inde-
pendence. Said President Eduardo Q. Pitman, in February, 1952: "The feeling of all
league and club executives at this time is unanimous that we will not join Organized Ball
since we are proud of our independence. This does not mean, of course, that we are not
ready for friendly agreements and pacts with Organized Ball." Sporting News, Feb. 20,
1952, p. 28, col. 3.
42. Sporting News, Aug. 20, 1952, p. 38, col. 2.
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remedial or punitive action is appropriate in the premises."43 Appropriate
action may consist of a public reprimand,44 fine,4 probation, 40 temporary
suspension,47 or permanent blacklisting. 48 In addition, he keeps careful tab
on each major league player and may discipline those who fail to abide by the
leagues' monopsonistic player agreements. 49 George M. Trautman, president
of the National Association, exercises similar functions for the minor leagues 60
43. Major League Agreement, art. I, HEARINGS, 1121-2.
44. Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, Commissioner I, publicly castigated a group of
major league players in 1927 for contributing money to a rival club as a reward for
defeating a pennant contender, conduct which he described as "an act of impropriety,
reprehensible and censurable, but not corrupt." SPINK, JuDGE LANDIS AND TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS OF BASEBALL 171 (1947).
45. Senator A. B. Chandler, Commissioner II, levied forty-one fines on clubs or their
employees from 1946 to 1950 for various infractions of the combination's rules or conduct
"detrimental to baseball." HIMUNGs, 340-1.
46. Ford Frick, Commissioner III, placed outfielder Jim Rivera on a year's "proba-
tion" for "moral delinquency" shortly after the player was exonerated from a rape
charge by a Chicago grand jury. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1952, p. 39, col. 2. "It is no
secret that if Frick ...had not been warned by his lawyers that to throw Rivera out
of baseball would invite a suit, the outfielder would have been given the heave-ho."
Sporting News, Nov. 19, 1952, p. 1, col. 1.
47. Chandler suspended Leo Durocher from organized baseball for the 1947 season
because of an accumulation of alleged improprieties. N.Y. Times, April 10, 1947, p, 1,
col. 6.
48. One of the first acts of Judge Landis as Commissioner was to blacklist perma-
nently eight players of the Chicago White Sox who were alleged to be involved in the
"Black Sox scandal"-the "throwing" of the 1919 World Series to Cincinnati. N.Y.
Times, Mar. 13, 1921, p. 16, col. 1; Housa REPORT, 60. One of his last acts was to force
out a major league club owner for gambling on his club's games. N.Y. Times, Nov. 24,
1943, p. 24, col. 1.
49. The most famous example in recent years was the five-year blacklisting sentence
imposed on eighteen major league players who spurned the clubs "owning" their contracts
to play in the Mexican League in 1946. HouSE REPORT, 77-84; HEARINGs, 1303. After
three years and the filing of three antitrust suits, Chandler "tempered justice with mercy"
and reinstated the "jumpers." HEARINGS, 1587-8. In 1949 Chandler fined the New York
Giants $2,000 and Manager Leo Durocher $500 for the latter's offer of employment to
Coach Fred Fitzsimmons of the Boston Braves. Fitzsimmons was also fined $500 and
suspended one month for assuming, contrary to organized baseball's rules, that he could
sell his services in a free market. HEARINGS, 305-06. For other illustrative decisions
by the Commissioner of Baseball enforcing the monopsonistic agreements of organized
baseball, see HEARINGS, 222-3, 311-12, 317-23, 627-87.
50. National Association Agreement, §§ 6, 15.08-15.14, 16.02, 19, 21, HEARINGS, 1191-
3, 1204-5, 1207, 1210-4. George M. Trautman, president of the National Association,
permanently banished a minor league player for his implication in the University of
Kentucky basketball scandals. N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1952, p. 15, col. 5. Trautman's
predecessor, in 1943, ordered forfeiture of games played by Hartford (Eastern League)
as punishment for the employment of a blacklisted player. N.Y. Times, June 30, 1943,




The only appeal from the decisions of these industry czars is to the courts,
a step which few have ventured to take.r'
Monopsony in the Player Market
At the foundation of organized baseball's trade practices is the "reserve
rule," an agreement not to compete for players' services. By a time-honored
system for division of the player market, each club in organized baseball is
given exclusive right to bargain with its "reserved" players. By foreclosing
market alternatives from the player, each club wields the economic power of
the entire combination in determining the price it pays for its most important
factor of production. The player, facing 335 clubs acting as one, must either
accept the salary offered or leave his profession.
The present reserve rule, like many other baseball trade practices, repre-
sents a compromise between two conflicting motives. For the individual club.
profits and intangible rewards are directly related to the playing success of
the team. A club which wins 63 percent of its games tends to draw t,.ice as
many fans as it would winning 42 percent of its games and three times as
many as it would winning 25 percent of its games. Each club, therefore, is
desirous of employing the best players it can findY2
If left unchecked, however, the individual club's pursuit of the best player
talent will tend to destroy first the club's competitors and ultimately the club
itself. Only one club in a league can win the pennant, and unless the losers
can also prosper, the victor of one year may become bankrupt the next
through lack of opponents to play. Collective financial success for a league
requires continued equality of competition on the playing field. Aside from
fluctuations due to the business cycle, the collective profits of competing clubs
within the same league are directly related to the closeness of the pennant
race. Analysis of the major leagues since 1920 indicates that at any given
level of national prosperity, a leaue ,irives 50 percent more gate receipts
if the pennant-winning club averages .575 in won and lost percentage than
if it averages .750. Such equality among league members is promoted by
51. Prior to the recent rash of treble damage actions, there were only three appeals
for legal redress from the decisions of the Commissioner or minor league president. In
Milwaukee American Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298 (N.D. Ill. 1930) (injunctive relief
denied to a major league club owner who had lost reserve rights to a player for his
violation of the Major League Rules), the aggrieved party withdrew his appeal after
Landis threatened to resign. HousE REPoRT, 67. Other instances involved blacdlisted
players. Bennie Kauff, banned for life in 1921 for an alleged car theft, failed in his
bid for reinstatement by court order. Kauff v. National Elhibition Co., No. 2269, N.Y.
Sup. Ct, N.Y. County, Jan. 17, 1922. Two of the "Black So." (see note 43 supra) failed
in their bid to recover damages on a common law conspiracy charge. Felsch v. American
League Baseball Club of Chicago, Inc. and Risberg v. American League Baseball Club
of Chicago, Inc., Cir. Ct, Milw-aukee, Wis., May 12, 1923.
52. Hous- RFPor, 103-104; HEARINGS, 1593.
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trade practices which make it possible for each club to hire teams of relative-
ly equal ability.53
From the inception of professional baseball in 1864 until 1879, players were
free to sign with whomever they pleased. Because a single club's success de-
pended upon its players' abilities, the bidding for talent was intense. "Revolv-
ing," or transferring from club to club for a higher salary, became such a com-
mon practice that most of the star performers gravitated to the wealthiest clubs.
Competition on the ball field became a farce. In 1869 the Cincinnati Red
Stockings played 57 games without a defeat. In 1875 the Boston Red Stock-
ings won the professional championship with 71 victories and only 8 losses.
Their nearest competitor, the Philadelphia Athletics, won 53 games and lost
20. The last-place Brooklyn Atlantics won only 2 games and lost 42.5
4
Due to this unbridled competition for players' services, player salaries ac-
counted for two-thirds of the average club's expenses, and no club could report
any profits to its stockholders. Of twenty-five clubs which competed in the
first professional league, 1871-75, sixteen were financial failures. Eight of
the nine survivors reorganized into the National League in 1876, but prospects
for the young industry failed to improve. Again no club made money. Of
the fifteen clubs admitted to membership in the first four years, eight folded
by the end of the 1879 season.5 5 In a desperate attempt to avert financial
ruin, the seven survivors voted secretly to permit each club to "reserve" five
of its players for the 1880 season. The league members agreed not to compete
for the services of any reserved player.5 6 The new rule not only enabled clubs
to reduce their payrolls but also brought more equal playing competition and
consequent increases in gate receipts. Each year from 1881 until 1890, at
least five National League members made money, and the mortality rate of
clubs sharply declined.5 7
The reserve rule agreement did not come out into the open until 1883, when
the National League. entered a "National Agreement" with its strongest rival,
the old American Association. This agreement, which marked the formal
beginning of organized baseball, set up a board of arbitration to govern the
sport, permitted each club to reserve a full team (nine players and two sub-
stitutes), and authorized fines for any club failing to honor reserve lists or
player contracts.58 The last link in this monopsonistic agreement was added
a few years later when the clubs agreed to make player contracts and reser-
vation rights assignable within organized baseball, thus reducing players to
quasi-chattels who could be bought, sold, or bartered."9
53. House RE:PoRT, 104-105.
54. Id. at 17-22.
55. Id. at 18-22.
56. Id. at 22, 111.
57. Id. at 23-5; TURKIN & THom.xPsoN, OFFICIAL BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA 402-04
(1951).
58. HAMNGS, 141-3, HousE REPORT, 26-7.
59. House REPORT, 29-31. While the transfer of this right is commonly referred
to as the sale o.f a player or player contract, actually it is merely the transfer of the
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As originally formulated, the reserve rule carried no sanctions against
players who chose to ignore reservation claims. Although the owners' agree-
ment barred such players from obtaining employment elsewhere in organized
baseball, they were free to seek more remunerative employment among the
many independent professional clubs without foreclosing a later return to their
reserving club if they desired., 0
The clubs in organized baseball quickly realized the potentialities of the
reserve rule. Having agreed among themselves not to compete for each other's
players, they sought to expand their monopsony power throughout the entire
baseball industry. They blacklisted players who were lured to the free marlket
and boycotted independent clubs or leagues until such outlaws were forced
out of business or joined the combination as "minor leagues." '
Against well-financed leagues, however, the blacklist and boycott proved
to be ineffective to halt the exodus of players offered higher salaries.G2 To
remedy this situation, organized baseball sought the aid of courts of equity.
exclusive right to employ a player. Because each player is obliged to sign a contract
granting the dub the rights to reserve him for the succeeding year and to assign his
services elsewhere in organized baseball (Hr.uUnixs, 1249-52, 1255-7), these sales, for
convenience, are here referred to as the sale of player contracts in the colloquial sense.
Despite the promises of the player in the uniform contract, courts have been reluctant
to interpret transfers as obligating the player to report to the transferee club, because of
the constitutional prohibition of involuntary servitude. The consideration for transfer
payments is the mere promise of the transferor club to release the player. Augusta Base-
ball Ass'n v. Thomasville Baseball Club. 147 Ga. 201, 93 S.E. 203 (1917); Armour v.
American Base Ball and Athletic Exhibition Co. of St. Louis, C.P., Cincinnati, Ohio, June
27, 1902, Philadelphia Public Ledger, June 28, 1902, p. 20, col. 7. The player's refusal to re-
port to the purchasing club does not constitute a breach of the contract to sell Toledo
Base Ball Co. v. von der Abe, No. 4339, C.C.N.D. Ohio, Feb. 24, 1Q35. Cf. Macon Baseball
Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennington, 45 Ga. App. 611, 166 S.E. 35 (1932). Agreements for the
sale of player contracts have never been contested as being void in restraint of trade.
Recalcitrant players, effectively assigned by "baseball law," have been uniformly suc-
cessful in recovering damages for breach of contract from the transferor club, both when
they refused to accept the assignment, Griffin v. Brooklyn Ball Club, 63 App. Div. 566,
73 N.Y. Supp. 864 (4th Dep't 1902) ; Kelly v. St. Paul Baseball Club, No. 92841, Minn.
Dist Ct, St Paul, 3finn., May 23, 1906; Kinney v. Newark Federal League Ball Club, Inc.,
No. 21225-1916, N.Y. Sup. Ct, Oct. 16, 1917; and when they reported to the assignee
166 App. Div. 484, 151 N.Y. Supp. 557 (1st Dep't 1915), aff'd, 221 N.Y. 704, 117 N.E. 1061
(1917) ; George v. Kansas City American Ass'n Baseball Co., 219 S.W. 134 (Mo. App.
1920) ; Hofman v. Chicago League Ball Club, 195 Ill. App. 249 (1915). The effectiveness of
transfers of the exclusive right to employ players stems, therefore, not from enforcement
by civil courts but from the blacklisting sanctions of organized baseball.
Player contracts have been transferred for twenty-five cents, Reach Base Ball Guide,
1907, p. 470; for $250,000, Sporting News, June 25, 1952, p. 4, cols. 3, 4, N.Y. Times,
Oct 27, 1934, p. 10, col. 1; for a bulldog, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1915, p. 10, cal. 3; for
a bird dog, ibid; for a turkey, Sporting News, Nov. 12, 1952, p. 11, col. 3; and for an
airplane, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1924, p. 17, col. 2.
60. 1,3 National Agreement, E 5; HEABmNGS, 142; Hous R O ir, 34.
61. See, e.g., the account of the 1834 Union Association war. HousE Romn'er, 27-8.
62. See, e.g., the account of the 1890 Players League War. HousE RPao T, 33.
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Beginning in 1887, every player's contract in organized baseball contained a
"reserve clause," by which the player recognized the club's right to reserve
him for the succeeding year. 3 The club owners interpreted the reserve clause
as a valid "option to renew" which would give legal sanction to their monop-
sonistic agreement. The courts, however, felt otherwise.6 4 Whenever clubs
in organized baseball sought to restrain players from "violating" the reserve
crause to play for an independent league, judges turned a deaf ear. During the
Players' League War of 1890, state courts in both New York and Penn-
sylvania refused to restrain players from leaving their reserving clubs to join
the new league, on the ground that the reserve clause was indefinite, lacking in
mutuality, and unconscionable.6 The federal court in New York City denied
injunctive relief on the ground that the reserve clause was nothing more than
"a contract to make a contract if the parties can agree."' 6
Attempts to tighten the reserve clause to meet judicial objections without
sacrificing its features as an agreement not to compete for players' services 67
63. HouSE REPORT, 31-3. The original "reserve clause" read:
"It is further understood and agreed that the said party of the first part shall have
the right to reserve the said party of the second part for the season ensuing the term
mentioned in paragraph 2, herein provided, and said right and privilege is hereby accorded
the said party of the first part upon the following conditions, which are to be taken
and construed as conditions precedent to the exercise of such extraordinary right or
privilege, viz:
"I. That the said party of the second part shall not be reserved at a salary less
than that mentioned in the twentieth paragraph herein except by consent of the party
of the second part.
"II. That the said party of the second part, if he be reserved by the said party of
the first part for the next ensuing season, shall be one of not more than fourteen players
then under contract; that is, that the right of reservation be limited to that number of
players and no more." Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 24 Abb. N.C. 393, 400,
9 N.Y. Supp. 779, 781-2 (Sup. Ct. 1890).
64. See cases cited notes 65, 66 infra and House REPORT, 33-4.
65. Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 24 Abb. N.C. 393, 9 N.Y. Supp. 779 (Sup.
Ct. 1890); Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Hallman, 8 Pa. County Ct. 57 (C.P. 1890).
The complete uniform player's contract then used is reprinted in the Ward case, 24 Abb.
N.C. at 395-401.
66. Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 Fed. 198, 204, 24 Abb. N.C. 419, 429
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890).
67. "Amos Rusie, after leading the National League in strikeouts for six successive
seasons and winning 24 games for New York in 1895, decided he deserved something
better than a salary reduction from $3,500 to $3,400 in 1896. He held out for the entire
season, believing that after a year his reserve clause would lapse and he would be eligible
to sign with the highest bidder. When the New York Giants reserved him again in 1897,
Rusie filed a suit in a New Jersey Federal court seeking $5,000 damages and an uncon-
ditional release. The case was settled out of court." HousE RMoT, 36. Rusie v. National
Exhibition Co., No. 3893, C.C.D.N.J., May 26, 1897. The experience of this suit and the
Players League litigation prompted the National League to revise the reserve clause to
provide for two or three one-year options to renew at a predetermined salary. Griffin v.
Brooklyn Ball Club, 68 App. Div. 566, 569, 73 N.Y. Supp. 864, 866 (4th Dept. 1902);
Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 10 Pa. Dist. 309, 310 (C.P. 1901). This change was
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proved a failure. When the American League bolted organized baseball i
1901, proclaimed itself a major league, and raided National League clubs fc
reserved players, court actions failed to stop the stampede for higher salarie
Pennsylvania enjoined three National League players from jumping the r
serve clause to play with the Philadelphia Athletics,6s but two of the playei
signed new contracts with the Cleveland American League club and Oh
refused to enforce the Pennsylvania decree. 9 Missouri likewise refused I
enforce this clause in equity, in part on the ground that the uniform player
contract was made in furtherance of a combination in restraint of trade
Another element in organized baseball's monopsonistic agreement not i
compete for players' services has been the attempted enforcement of playi
contracts, as distinguished from the reservation right, during the term of suc
believed to provide sanctity in contract law for the agreement not to compete for playei
services. In practice, however, players were required to sign new contracts containi
identical renewal features before participating in more than five games of their secoi
year. Thus, players were as effectively bound to their reserving clubs as under the mo
conventional reserve clause. Philadelphia Public Ledger, May 8, 1902, p. 16, col. 7.
68. Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie, No. 789, Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd.
Fraser, No. 790, Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Bernhard, No. 791, C.P., Philadelphi
Pa., April 28, 1902. These decrees were based on the State Supreme Court's decisio
in Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 Ad. 973 (190), ruersing 10 F
Dist. 309 (C.P. 1901). Lajoie, who had received a $2,400 salary with the Phillies, receiv
$5,500 under his 1902 contract with the American League. Philadelphia Public Ledg
April 24, 1902, p. 16, col. 3.
69. Philadelphia Base Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie, 13 Ohio Dec. 504 (C.P. 1902); Phil
dephia Base Ball Club, Ltd. v. Bernhard, No. 79544, C.P., Cleveland, Ohio, Aug. 16, 19C
Fraser voluntarily returned to the Phillies. Philadelphia Public Ledger, May 16, 1902, p. I
col 6.
70. American Base Ball & Athletic Exhibition Co. of St. Louis v. Wallace and Hei
rick, Nos. 24647-A and 24648-A, St. Louis Cir. CL, May 6, 1902, decided on the basis
American Base Ball & Athletic Exhibition Co. v. Harper, 54 CFrar. LJ. 449 (St. Lot
Cir. Ct. 1902.) Defendants' attorney, John D. Johnson, in his final argument, April 29, 19(
"called attention to the reserve rule, whereby the players are held for a club from ye
to year, and stated that the National League violated the antitrust law at least in sph
when it dictated the salary of players and the admission to be charged to the games." c
Louis Globe-Democrat, April 30, 1902, p. 13, col. 4. The court denied the injunctio
on the grounds that the contracts (1) lacked mutuality; (2) were elements of a cot
bination in violation of the Sherman Act; and (3) abrogated the players' constitution
rights to follow their chosen occupation. Harper case, 54 CUmnT. U.J. 449 (St. Louis Cir. (
1902), Philadelphia -Public Ledger, May 7, 1902, p. 18, coL 3. In the Philadelpb
cases, counsel for player-defendants also charged that the National League constitutic
rules, and regulations violated the Sherman Act "because every player who entered t
service of the National League was reduced to a condition of perpetual servitude, m
that every member of the League has combined in an illegal contract in restraint
trade." Philadelphia Public Ledger, April 29, 1902, p. 14, col. 3. Judge Ralston, howev(
rejected this contention and made the injunctions permanent. Ibid.; St. Louis Glot
Democrat, April 29, 1902, p. 13, col 4. Appeals were pending on this issue when J
case became moot because of Lajoie's and Bernhard's transfers to Cleveland. Philadelph
Public Ledger, May 3, 1902, p. 22, cols. 3-4; May 6, 1902, p. 14, col. 4; May 7, 1902, p. I
col. 3; June 12, 1902, p. 16, col. 6.
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contracts. Since the inception of uniform player contracts in 1879, every
player contract has contained a clause by which the player promises to per-
form exclusively for his contracting club during the period of the contract,
usually one year.7 The general rule at common law is that personal service
contracts are terminable at will with the breaching party liable only for
damages. Injunctive relief to require specific performance will not lie, partly
because of the long established policy against involuntary servitude.1 2 Equity
will, however, enjoin the breach of negative covenants not to serve a compet-
ing employer when the performer's services are unique and when the contract
is definite, not lacking in mutuality, and not void as a restraint of trade. 70
Attempts by ball clubs to enjoin players from contract-jumping by such
"negative specific enforcement" have been almost as unsuccessful as attempts
to prevent reserve-jumping. Of ten attempts, petitioning clubs in organized
baseball obtained injunctions in only four cases, and in all of these success-
ful cases the players refused to return to their first-contracted employer. 74
71. The first uniform player contract is reprinted in HEAINGS, 1514-6; those used
in the major and minor leagues in 1951 appear in HEAINoS, 1248-59.
72. 5 CoaIN, CONTRACrS § 1204 (1951).
73. The leading case announcing this doctrine is Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G.M. & G.
603 (1852), in which Miss Wagner, the famous opera singer and niece of the great
composer, was enjoined from performing for a competitor of her employer. See also
Roy v. Bolduc, 140 Me. 103, 34 A.2d 479 (1943), and 5 CORIN, CoNRAcrs §§ 1205-12
(1951).
74. American Association Base Ball Club of Kansas City v. Pickett, 8 Pa. County
Ct. 232 (C.P. 1890); Cincinnati Exhibition Co. v. Marsans, 216 Fed. 269 (E.D. Mo..
1914); Cincinnati Exhibition Co. v. Johnson, No. 612, C.P., Pittsburgh, Pa., Sept. 2,
1914; Indianapolis Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Burk, No. 740, C.P., Pittsburgh, Pa., Aug.
12, 1915.
The Pickett injunction was dismissed by consent of the plaintiff in return for the with-
drawal of a counter-suit, Players' National League Base Ball Club of Philadelphia v. Myers
et al., No. 1167, C.P., Philadelphia, Pa., Philadelphia Public Ledger, June 5,1890, p. 8, col. 6.
The Marsans injunction was dismissed after one year. Cincinnati Exhibition Co. v.
Marsans, No. 4314, E.D. Mo., Aug. 19, 1915 (Opinion, Record on Appeal, 69-75), appeal
dinnirsed, 232 Fed. 1020 (8th Cir. 1915). Johnson and Burk remained with their clubs,
preferring to avoid the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania courts rather than to return to
organized baseball. TuaxIN & THOMPSON, OFFICIAL BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA 38, 158
(1951).
Unsuccessful bids by organized baseball included: American Base Ball & Athletic
Exhibition Co. of St. Louis v. Harper, 54 CENT. L.J. 449 (St. Louis Cir. Ct. 1902) (lack
of uniqueness, lack of mutuality, restraint of trade prohibited by Sherman Act and by
federal and state constitutions); Brooklyn Baseball Club v. McGuire, 116 Fed. 783
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1902) (lack of mutuality, lack of uniqueness); Baltimore Base Ball Co.
v. Hayden and Wiltse, 14 Pa. Dist. 529, 31 Pa. County Ct. 500 (C.P. 1905) (improper
for equity to grant such drastic relief without hearing all interested parties) ; Cincinnati
Exhibition Co. v. Johnson, 190 Ill. App. 630 (1914) (lack of mutuality); American
League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 149 N.Y. Supp. 6 (Sup. Ct.
1914) (lack of mutuality, restraint of trade).
Retaliatory suits by independent leagues seeking to restrain players from jumping
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Unable to obtain the assistance of the courts of equity either in enforcin
the reserve rule or in preventing players from jumping existing contract.
organized baseball has been forced to rely on extralegal methods to keep player
in line. It has not sought court enforcement of the reserve clause since 190
and of the uniform player's contract since 1915. To prevent clubs in organize
baseball from tampering with players under contract or reservation with othe
members, it uses such threats as fines or forfeiture of games. To keep player
from yielding to tempting offers from clubs outside the combination, it relie
on the blacklist. And to discourage outsiders from making such offers, it usc
back to organized baseball have been equally unsuccessful: Thorner v. Wise, No. 17Z
C.C.D. Mass., May 12, 1882 (no jurisdiction over parties); Thorner v. Wise, No. 306
Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass., May 17, 182 (no temporary restraining order issued; case Iate
settled out of court); Allegheny Base Ball Club v. Bennett, 14 Fed. 257 (C.C.W.D. P
1882); St. Louis Athletic Ass'n v. Mullane, No. 3642, C.C.S.D. Ohio, May 13, 18(opinion reprinted, Sporting Life, May 21, 1884, p. 2, col. 1) (rejecting doctrine o
Lumley v. Wag;er); Baltimore Base Ball & E.ibition Co. v. Childs, 1 Balt. City Re,
169 (1891) (withdrawal of American Association from National Agreement construc
as repudiation of contract) ; Columbus Base Ball Club v. Reilly, 25 Ohio Dec. 272 (1991
(lack of uniqueness, adequate remedy at law); Weegham v. Killefer, 215 Fed. 239 (61
Cir. 1914), affirming 215 Fed. 163 (W.D. Mich.) (unclean hands in inducing player I
ignore reserve clause of prior contract).
Legal battles within organized baseball for players' services have been rare due I
the efficiency of the combination's self-regulation. The first such case to arise was Da
v. Smith, CO-1886, N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, Sept. 30, 1886. John ("Phenomenal"
Smith, a young pitching sensation, signed an 1887 contract with the New York Giant
then signed to play with Detroit for the remainder of the 1886 season. The court ordere
Detroit to refrain from employing Smith until it agreed not to reserve him for the 18K
season as it was entitled to do under the National Agreement. Sporting Life, Oct. 6, 18M
p. 1, col. 1. In Harrisburg Base Ball Club of York v. Athletic Ass'n of Harrisburg,
Pa. County Ct. 337 (C.P. 1890), the court rejected the doctrine of Lumley v. Wlagni
and the Harrisburg club was able to retain the services of contract-jumper Frank Gran
one of the last Negro players to play in organized baseball prior to the imposition c
the color ban. When the New York Giants in 1903 induced shortstop George Davis t
desert the Chicago White Sox in violation of the truce agreement between the America
and National Leagues, Chicago successfully enjoined the breach of contract. America
League Base Ball Club of Chicago v. Davis, No. 240340, Cook County (Ill.) Cir. Ct
July 3, 1903; and No. R-8505, C.C.S.D.N.Y., July 15, 1903. The Giants sought to r(
taliate by enjoining Norman "Kid" Elberfeld from playing with the New York Higi
landers in the American League. Elberfeld had signed two 1903 contracts, one with th
Giants and the other with Detroit; the Highlanders bought the Detroit contract for $,0W
The injunction was denied on the ground that the Giants waived any claim to Elberfeld
services by signing the peace pact with the American League. National Exhibition C
v. Elberfeld, CO-1903-N-409, N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, July 15, 1903.
Players have not been the only contract-jumpers. Branch Rickey, who breached hi
contract with the St. Louis Browns to become president and business manager of th
St. Louis Cardinals at twice the salary, was enjoined in St. Louis American League Base
ball Co. v. Rickey, No. 9320-B, St. Louis Cir. Ct., April 5, 1917; later dismissed b
consent of plaintiff, N.Y. Times, April 7, 1917, p. 10, col. 5.
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the boycott. Where blacklisting and boycotts prove ineffective, it supplements
them with spirited salary wars."
Today, organized baseball's agreements establishing a player monopsony
are manifested in both the uniform player's contract and the trade regulations.
Each player contract contains a reserve clause granting the club or its assignee
the right to renew the contract for the succeeding year on all of the same terms
except salary. If player and club are unable to agree as to new salary terms,
the contract authorizes the club to fix the salary itself. In the major leagues
the club may not reduce the salary by more than 25 percent; in the minor
leagues the only limit to the club's discretion is the possibility of the player
abandoning his calling. Because each new contract also contains an identical
reserve clause, the club or its assignee has a perpetual option on the player's
services.7 3
Teeth to enforce the reserve rule are provided in the Major-Minor League
Agreement. The Major League Executive Council and the president of the
National Association are there authorized to prescribe the form of the uniform
player's contract. No club or player may sign a contract varying from speci-
fications, including any waiver of the right to reserve, without the consent of
the Executive Council, in the case of major leagues, or the National Asso-
ciation president, in the case of minor league contracts. Making any agree-
ment not embodied in the uniform contract without such consent from the
authorities subjects both player and club to disciplinary action.77
Supplementing this provision for a uniform contract is the requirement that
each club annually file a list of players it is reserving for the ensuing season.
These lists are then combined and circulated throughout organized baseball.
75. HousE REPoRT, 35, 47-8, 50-3, 60, 77-82, 114-118. Organized baseball has also
obtained an unexpected assist from the Immigration Commission in enforcing its player
monopsony. The Commission, in construing the new McCarran-Walter Immigration Act,
Pub. L. No. 414, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (June 27, 1952), has assured the industry that
foreign players who are admitted to play with organized baseball will be subject to im-
mediate deportation if they jump their contracts. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1953, p. 23, col. 2.
76. HousE REPORT, 112-113, 118. The present reserve clause in major league con-
tracts reads as follows:
"On or before February 1 (or if a Sunday, then the next preceding business day) of
the year next following the last playing season covered by this contract, the club may
tender to the player a contract for the term of that year by mailing the same to the player
at his address following his signature hereto, or if none be given, then at his last address
of record with the club. If prior to the March 1 next succeeding said February 1, the
player and the club have not agreed upon the terms of such contract, then or before
10 days after said March 1, the club shall have the right by written notice to the player
at said address to renew this contract for the period of 1 year on the same terms, except
that the amount payable to the player shall be such as the club shall fix in said notice;
provided, however, that said amount, if fixed by a major league club, shall be an amount
payable at a rate not less than 75 percent of the rate stipulated for the preceding year."
House REFORT, 113 n.66; HEARiNGs, 1251-2.
77. Major-Minor League Rule 3(a). HEARINGS, 1159.
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"[N]o player on any list shall be eligible to play for any other club until his
contract has been assigned or until he has been released." 78 If a player refuses
to sign a contract with his reserving club, he becomes ineligible to play for
any club in organized baseball.70 On being removed from the blacklist, he
can play only with the club which last had option on his services.8" The
Commissioner of Baseball and the National Association president administer
these blacklisting provisions.8 '
Of 8,000 active players in 1951, only eight held contracts without a reserve
clause. Forty minor league players attempted to obtain contracts with this
clause stricken, but the president of the National Association refused to ap-
prove thirty-two of them. No player in the major leagues has attempted to
obtain a contract waiv.ing the reserve clause since before 1921.82
Aside from the rare player who obtains permission to sign a contract omit-
ting the reserve clause, the only players on the free market are "free agents"
-unwanted players who have been released or young rookies just entering the
profession. To ease the pressure for higher salaries caused by these free
agents and the zealous club owner, forty-two of the forty-five leagues have
buttressed the reserve rule with agreements fixing salary limits13 These
agreements, contained in the league constitutions, prescribe an identical maxi-
mum monthly payroll for each member of the same league. They prevent any
league member from being too liberal in its discretion in fixing the salaries of
reserved players. However, their effectiveness in depressing salaries of free
agents has been limited by the practice of paying bonuses to desirable new
players. Such bonuses are not presently counted in the salary limits.
Organized baseball's monopsonistic agreements in the player market brought
stability to the industry and, at least for the major leagues, prosperity. The
reserve rule enabled club owners initially to reduce player salaries to levels
where it was possible to balance the budget. It also brought the unanticipated
blessing of more equal competition on the playing field, increasing both attend-
ance and profits.8 4 Player salaries, after an initial decline, also increased,
although not in proportion to the rise in the dubs' revenue. Vhereas major
league gross receipts in 1950 were eight, times the 1M83 level,8 5 the average
78. Major-Minor League Rule 4(a). Hz-,mxGs, 1162.
79. Major-Minor League Rule 15. HEml NGs, 1171.
80. Major-Minor League Rule 16(a). HEAMGS, 1171-2.
81. Major-Minor League Rule 15, 16. HAluMGs, 1171-2.
82. HousE RaoRr, 170.
83. Only the tvo major leagues and the Pacific Coast League are without salary
limits. HousE REPoRT, 121. Authorization for league salary limits is contained in the
National Association Agreement, arL 18. Hr.uuxs, 1209. For a synopsis of league
salary limits, 1910-51, see HA~RuGs, 1350-92.
84. HousE RE RT, 23-5.
85. Gross receipts for the sixteen major league clubs in 183 tas appro:dmately
$480,000. This rose to about $39,60,UJ00 by 1950. HoLTsE REronT, 26.
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major league player's salary was $11,000 80 or only seven times that of 1883.87
The consumers price index tripled between 1883 and 1950.88
The reserve rule has had far-reaching effects on the economic behavior of
clubs in organized baseball. Expenditures which once were allocated to player
salaries have now been diverted to other markets in the competition for player
talent. The share of major league expenses devoted to paying actual producers
of the game dropped from 67 percent at the time the reserve rule was
adopted 89 to 35 percent in 1929 and 22 percent in 1950.90 Major league clubs
in 1950 allocated from 25 to 40 percent of their expenditures for the purchase
of player contracts and the search for new players who had not yet signed
contracts which removed them from the free market.91
In the minor leagues, salaries are considerably below major league levels.
The average monthly salary for players in the AAA leagues in 1951 was
$850; in the AA leagues, $600; in the A leagues, $350; in the B leagues, about
$250; in the C leagues, about $200; and in the D leagues, $165.2 Players
in the A, B, C, and D leagues were receiving less in 1950 than players in
the same classifications in 1929 despite the 37 percent increase in the cost of
living.9
3
The Farm System: Vertical Integration
In the free market existing prior to the adoption of the reserve rule, the
best player talent gravitated to the major league clubs whose larger consumer
markets enabled them to offer higher salaries. Because each club sought the
most skillful players it could afford, players advanced to higher-paying
clubs as their ability warranted. The reserve rule did not arrest this flow of
talent from the smaller clubs to the larger ones. Instead, it shifted buyer
attention from the player himself to the club which "owned" the exclusive
right to employ the player. The commodity representing this intangible right
bestowed by "baseball law" was the uniform player contract.0 4 While players
86. HousE REPORT, 110. This figure represents the median salary. The mean salary
was somewhat higher ($13,288) due to the presence of a few high-salaried stars. Ibid.
87. The median salary of 30 players for whom 1883 salary data are available was
$1600. SPALDING BASE BALL GUIDE, 1890; HARRY WIGHT, NoTE AND AccouNT Boois
(unpublished records in N.Y. Public Library).
88. The consumers price index (1935-39 base period, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York) rose from 57.3 in 1883 to 171.9 in 1950. DEP'T oF
COMMERcEc HIsToRICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1945, p. 235 (1949);
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 278 (1952).
89. HousE REPORT, 21, 109.
90. HEARINGS, 1611; HOUSE REPORT, 109.
91. The Chicago Cubs allocated $813,054 of $2,098,000 total expenditures for "player
replacement," HEARINGS, 871, 1609; and the New York Yankees, $946,268 of $3,715,000
(including $668,000 income taxes), HEARINGS, 873, 1605.
92. HOUSE REPORT, 110; HEARINGS, 965, 1612.
93. HEARINGS, 1611.
94. See note 59 supra.
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lost any influence over their advancement to higher-paying clubs, promotion
remained possible through the medium of this artificial market for contracts,
in which clubs were both buyer and seller.
The past sixty years have been marked by a continual narrowing of the
market for player contracts. Not only has organized baseball monopsonized
the player market to the exclusion of independent leagues, but within the
combination individual clubs have attempted to engross the cream of promis-
ing new talent. One manifestation of this combination within a combination
is the farm system, organized baseball's version of vertical integration.
At first the major leagues were reluctant to allow minor league clubs to
reserve players. To do so meant that the majors could obtain player replace-
ments only by paying "exorbitant" prices to minor league clubs for the trans-
fer of player contracts. The minor league clubs, however, found that without
the assurance of a nucleus of a team from year to year and the power to regu-
late salaries they could not survive. The result was a compromise, reached in
1892. The majors granted the minors the right of reserving players but insisted
in return that at the end of each season the majors be permitted to "draft"
the contracts of promising players at fixed prices. The minor leagues were
divided into two classes, A and B, according to their financial strength. Major
league clubs could draft any player contract from an A league for $1,000, and
clubs in both the major and A leagues were allowed to acquire contracts from
B leagues at $500 apiece.05
The compromise brought added stability to the minor leagues and enabled
the major leagues to acquire the best talent available at a nominal cost. In
addition, the annual draft stimulated activity in the market for player contracts.
A minor league club, hoping to realize more on the inevitable advancement
of a promising player to a higher classification, usually attempted to sell the
player's contract at an advantageous price before the draft period began. The
combined result guaranteed the players an opportuniq, to rise to the top of
their profession without being chained indefinitely by the reserve rule to a
poorly paying club-"
Ambitious major league clubs have frequently tried to engross the supply
of minor league player contracts. At first some clubs drafted or purchased
player contracts wholesale each fall, took their pick of players in the spring,
and then "farmed" the remaining players to minor league clubs with agree-
ments that they would be returned before the next draft period. Other clubs
found that control of players was more successful when they purchased clubs
in the minor leagues. 97 From the turn of the century until 1914, the combina-
tion made determined efforts to block these maneuvers by prohibiting farm-
ing, limiting each club to the control of thirty-five players or less, and barring
the ownership of minor league subsidiaries.08 Enforcement of these limita-
95. HousE REPORT, 36, 142.
96. Id. at 142, 144-5.
97. Id. at 44-5.
98. Id. at 44-6, 156-9, 181.
19531
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
tions began to wane in 1914, when the Federal League, advertising itself as
a third major league, challenged organized baseball's player monopsony. Such
enforcement collapsed entirely by 1920, when the revelation of the Black Sox
scandal prompted the major leagues to replace the National Commission with
a single Commissioner, Judge Kenesaw M. Landis. In the interim the modern
farm system gained a foothold it never relinquished. 9
Pioneering the movement toward vertical integration were the St. Louis
Cardinals, under the genius of their general manager, Branch Rickey. Begin-
ning in 1920 with the purchase of an obscure club in Arkansas, the Cardinals
amassed a minor league empire which at its height controlled twenty-eight
clubs: thirteen owned outright and the remainder controlled by working agree-
ments. This farm system developed three times as many major league players
as the Cardinals needed to remain in pennant contention. Therefore, the
Cardinals maintained a policy of selling the contracts of their older or un-
needed players to other clubs, realizing income that made them the most
profitable enterprise in the National League. 00
To keep from being frozen out of the market for new players, other major
league clubs were themselves forced to enter farming. The industry's rules
were periodically circumvented or amended, over the opposition of Commis-
sioner Landis and a minority of the club owners, to keep pace with these
farming ventures.101 Both the number and percentage of independent clubs
in the minor leagues have constantly dwindled. By the end of the 1952 season,
major league clubs controlled 175 of 319 clubs in the minor leagues.102
Today only skeletons remain of the rules which originally were designed
to keep the market in player contracts open and to ensure the advancement
of players commensurate with their ability. The draft, which once assured
every player in the minor leagues of an opportunity for advancement, now
covers barely ten percent of minor league players.' 03 Fewer independent clubs
remain which have player contracts to sell; fewer clubs are in the market to
buy, since most major league clubs today rely on their own farm systems to
supply replacements. Players who have signed with one of the major league
farm organizations must rely on the judgment of one major league club for
99. Id. at 60, 62-74, 159.
100. id. at 63-5, 94-5.
101. Id. at 64-74.
102. Sporting News, Dec. 3, 1952, p. 23, col. 4; NATIONAL AssociATI'o, 1952 Hion-
LIGHTS passim (1952). In 1927 all but 18 minor league clubs were independent. F-ousf,
REPORt, 65-6. In 1951 there were 169 independent clubs compared to 195 farm clubs.
Id. at 188.
103. HousE REPokT, 144-6. In the early part of the century, major league clubs
drafted close to 100 players each year from the minor leagues. Id. at 145. In 1952 they
drafted only 11. Sporting News, Dec. 10, 1952, p. 9, col. 1. Of approximately 7,000
minor league players, 117 were drafted by minor league clubs of higher classification ill
1952. Id. at col. 5.
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their advancement. Frequently, a player of recognized major league ability
languishes in the minors for years, simply because the parent club has his
playing position adequately filled and will not sell his contract to a com-
petitor."" In short, for a majority of players in the minor leagues, advance-
ment no longer is based on the judgment of all clubs in higher classification-
exercised through a universal draft and a free market, but on the judgment
of one farm organization. 10 5
The disappearance of the free market for player contracts which typified
organized baseball 35 years ago has had far-reaching effects on the distribution
of baseball expenditures. It has diverted dubs' attention to the one free market
remaining: the market for free agents. The New York Yankees spend one
million dollars annually--one-third of their operating budget--on player de-
velopment. The bulk of this is spent on scouts, tryout camps, and bonuses,
all used to lure teen-age prospects into the Yankee farm system.10 Other
major league dubs, not blessed with consumer markets of comparable size,
spend somewhat lesser amounts. The situation has not been rare when a boy
has been besieged by sixteen offers on the day after his high school graduation,
when the hunting season officially begins.107 Bonuses to these rookies, most
of whom will never make the big leagues, range up to $150,000 103 and in
104. See, e.g., Horsz REPORT, 158; Hoffman, Toby Finaly Gels a Brca?. Baseball
Digest, Oct. 1952, pp. 81-4.
105. Indicative of the degree to which the reserve rule and the farm system have
retarded the advancement of players to the highest rung of their profssion is the average
age of new major league players. In the 1870's, the era of a completely free market,
the average age of the major league rookie vas 22. In the 18O's, when the rezerve
rule applied only to the major leagues, the average age was 23. From 1892 to 1919,
when the reserve rule extended throughout organized baseball but virtually all minor
league players were subject to the draft, the average age was 24. From 1920 to 1939,
with a restricted draft and fewer than half of the major league clubs possessing farm
systems, the average age rose to 25. During the 1940's, when the farm system Lecame
the rule rather than the exception, the average age of a major league roekie was 27.
This information is compiled from a random sample of players who participated in major
league games, 1871 to 1949, as reported in Ttr.i.N & Trroa tso:, OFICIAL B.,s~auat
ExcYcLoPEDIA 3-349 (1951). Participation in an accumulated number of games equal to
the following proportions of the major league schedule was used as the criterion f,-,r
determining the age at which a player became a "nmiajor leaguer": pitchers, 1/10th;
catchers, 1/4th; and other players, 1/3d.
The probative value of such evidence is, of course, tumpered by the unlmo,-n effect
of other variables such as military conscription and changes in the caliber of major league
play.
106. HEARINGS, 873, 1605.
107. Daley, Price-Fixing Needed, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1951, p. 33, col. 5.
108. The Cleveland Indians were rcported to have paid rookie pitcher "Billy Joe"
Davidson a $150,000 bonus on the day after his high schoul graduation for signing ,;ith
their farm system. N.Y. Times, May 30, 1951, p. 16, col. 5. For reports on the 1952
bonus orgy, see Sporting News, June 25, 1952, p. 4, col. 1; July 2, 1952, p. 1, col. 5.
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1951 totaled $4,500,000,109 which was almost equal to the aggregate salaries
of all active major league players." °
Opinions differ on the effect of the farm system upon minor league clubs.
Some assert that absentee control ruins fan interest in the home town club.
Others maintain that the minor leagues could not exist today without major
league financial and operational assistance. They claim that the glamour of
afliliation with a major league club actually enhances paid attendance. Despite
the fact that minor league farms are operated chiefly to develop players for
the parent club and only secondarily for the fans of the area, many minor
league clubs openly solicit major league tie-ups, knowing that they bring
financial and player assistance to the club. Independent minor league clubs,
unable to match the resources of farm organizations, generally must be satis-
fied with overlooked youngsters or overage veterans on their way down from
higher leagues."' As a consequence, minor league clubs blessed with farm
system ties not only control the best players, but also dominate the pennant
races of their respective leagues." 2
Division of Consumer Markets
The oldest restraint in professional baseball is "territorial rights," a euphe-
mism for the division of consumer markets. When the National League or-
ganized in 1876, one of its chief attractions to member clubs was the provision
in its constitution that no more than one club would be admitted from any
city. Experience in the old National Association (1871-75) had indicated that
two or three competing clubs in the same city usually spread attendance too
thin for the success of any club. By limiting each city to one club, the National
League hoped its members would have greater chance for financial success.'"
The rule also deprived the customers of any choice in selection and permitted
clubs to fix admission prices."14
109. Sporting News, Nov. 12, 1952, p. 8, col. 1. Sweeping restrictions on the pay-
ment of large bonuses were imposed by amendments to the Major-Minor League Rules
in December, 1952. Players who sign their initial professional baseball contracts for a
salary and bonus above $5,000 in the major leagues, $4,000 in the minor leagues of "A"
classification or higher, and $3,000 in the lower minor leagues are designated "bonus
players." Minor league bonus players are then subject to unrestricted draft before they
may be transferred in any manner to another club. Bonus players signed directly to
major league contracts must be retained for two years unless given an unconditional
release. Id. at col. 3' id., Dec. 17, 1952, p. 7, col. 5.
110. The 399 players employed by major league clubs as of July 1, 1951, were re-
ceiving annual salaries totaling $5,291,850. HEARINGS, 965.
111. HOUSE REPORT 108, 185-7 and notes.
112. Of 36 minor leagues in which major league clubs had farms in 1962, only eight
independent clubs won pennants. Sporting News, Dec. 3, 1952, p. 23, col. 2.
113. HoUSE REPoRT, 19; HEARINGS, 1513.




"Territorial rights" became an integral part of the first National Agree-
ment 11 5 and has remained a fundamental part of the code of organized base-
ball down to the present day."16 Whether a new professional league could
gain admission to organized baseball depended in large degree on whether it
intended to place clubs in cities "belonging" to clubs already in the combina-
tion. The rare occasions where leagues have been admitted which encroached
on existing franchises have been the result of inconclusive baseball wars.11 7
The justification for these local monopoly grants is that one healthy club
in a particular city is better than two or more starving ones."" On the as-
sumption that consumer demand for professional baseball is limited in each
metropolitan area, clubs in organized baseball have insisted on a veto power
over the invasion of their markets by interlopers. Because each club relies on
road receipts for part of its income, it also has insisted on authority to block
moves of league rivals to less lucrative or doubtful marketing areas. 10 Tradi-
tionally, clubs in organized baseball have been unwilling to permit each club's
individual discretion to determine whether a city presently occupied can sup-
port another club or whether a city without baseball can support a new club.
This division of consumer markets has been further complicated by the
passage of time. Local market monopolies, once bestowed, have become capi-
talized as part of the assets of each club and have strengthened the resistance
of clubs against any relaxation of the rules, which would jeopardize these
"investments."' 0' The traditions and identification with the community estab-
lished by many of the older clubs have raised further barriers to any relaxation
of territorial rights. Furthermore, the multiplication of leagues within or-
ganized baseball has complicated the problems of moving established fran-
chises. Any move of a major league club to a city not presently represented
in the majors may necessitate a complicated chain reaction of readjustments
throughout the minor leagues.
By entrenching major league dubs in most of the choice consumer markets,
the rules on territorial rights strengthen the dominion of the major leagues.
Having established themselves in the most lucrative cities, major league clubs
115. 1883 National Agreement, as amended 18S9, Hous- RoR', 27.
116. Major League Rule 1. HEAnIx-GS, 1125.
117. HouSE RnroRr, 26, 38-42.
118. This was the major selling point of territorial rights when the rule was first
adopted in 1876. HzAmNxGs, 1510, 1513.
119. In 1885 the president of the Metropolitan Base Ball Association transferred his
American Association club from Manhattan to Staten Island, hoping thereby to increase
the revenue of his ferry boat line. After his enraged league rivals summarily expelled
the Mets from the American Association, the club successfully enjoined the ouster for
want of just cause. Metropolitan Base Ball Ass'n v. Simmons, 1 Pa. County Ct. 134
(18S5); HousE REPoRT, 30. Since that occasion, inter-club and inter-league agreements
have effectively thwarted such club discretion.
120. Commissioner Frick testified before the Antitrust Sub:ommittee that the barriers
to franchise shifts had been increased by revisions in the rules on territorial rights "be-
cause of values more than anything else." HEAINGS, 110.
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possess the economic power to dictate modifications in the trade rules regard-
ing the control of players or of consumer markets. 121 Minor leagues may not
unilaterally violate the restrictions on player employment or market locations
without risk of explusion from organized baseball. 122 If expelled, they lose
their territorial rights and player monopsony privileges and, in any trade war
with the wealthier major leagues, may even risk annihilation.
Today only five cities are represented by more than one club. New York
has three major league clubs ;123 Chicago, Philadelphia, and St. Louis each
have two.' 24 Los Angeles has two representatives in the Pacific Coast
League. 125 Franchise shifts to territories already represented in organized
baseball have been virtually impossible under the combination's agreements.
Transfer of a major league club requires the approval of at least a majority of
its league competitors. If the transfer is to a city already occupied by the other
major league, unanimous approval of all major league clubs is required. 12 0
121. Gross operating income for major league clubs in 1950 ranged from $737,000
(St. Louis Browns) to $4,212,000 (New York Yankees) with $2,000,000 the average.
HEARINGS, 1605, 1609. The largest operating income in the minors was $599,0Od (Oak-
land, Pacific Coast League) with $300,000 the average in the five largest minor leagues.
Id. at 1629-35. To obtain the benefits of player reservation and territorial rights for
themselves, minor leagues were forced to enter the combination begun by the major
leagues on the major's own terms. Today, amendment of the Major-Minor League Agree-
ment and Rules requires the approval of both major leagues (or one major league and
the Commissioner) and three-fourths of the leagues in the National Association. Id. at
1124, 1175-6. Since major league clubs own or control about 60 percent of minor league
clubs, they can effectively thwart any changes proposed by independent clubs and are
virtually assured of being able to pass their own amendments. This situation brought
angry threats from the independent Dallas (Texas League) club at the last minor league
convention: "If this Association refuses to remove the existing inequities and centraliza-
tion of power of control in the hands of a few members of this Association who are
controlled by a few major league clubs, the independent minor league club owners will
be forced to seek equitable relief elsewhere." Sporting News, Dec. 10, 1952, p. 5, cols. 2-3.
122. National Association Agreement, §§ 10.02(a), 10.05, 30.03. HEARINGS, 1194-5,
1237.
123. New York Yankees, Inc.; National Exhibition Co. (Giants); and Brooklyn
National League Baseball Club, Inc. (Dodgers).
124. American League Baseball Club of Chicago, Inc. (White Sox) and Chicago
National League Ball Club (Cubs); American Baseball Club of Philadelphia (Athletics)
and Philadelphia National League Club (Phillies); American League Baseball Co, of
St. Louis (Browns) and St. Louis National Baseball Club, Inc. (Cardinals),
125. Los Angeles Baseball Club (Angels) and Hollywood Baseball Association
(Stars). San Francisco-Oakland and Minneapolis-St. Paul, which are classified by the
United States Bureau of Census as single metropolitan areas and which are, perhaps, con-
tiguous market areas, are also represented by two clubs.
126. These rules represent a slight relaxation of the former major league provisions
for club transfers. Prior to December, 1952, Major League Rule 1(c) required unanimous
consent from the interested club's league and majority approval of the other major league,
HEARNcs, 1125. Following the severe censuring of the rules on territorial rights by the
Antitrust Subcommittee (see HouSE REPORT, 189-203), the major leagues modified Rule
1(c) to its present form. Under the new rule, transfer of a National League franchise
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On the other hand, if a major league club desires to invade minor league terri-
tory, it must secure the consent of both the minor league and the club
concerned or pay "just and reasonable compensation" as determined by nego-
tiation or arbitration. 12 7 No minor league club can encroach upo:n major
league territory without written consent of the league concerned-a highly
unlikely possibility.1' 8
The alleged purpose of "territorial rights" is "to preserve and stimulate
competition for the League Pennant."'2 9 The result, however, has been in-
dustrial rigor mortis, with clubs placed at the mercy of population shifts and
competitors' vetoes. Prior to 1953, the last shift in the major leagues occurred
in 1903, when the Baltimore American League club moved to New York City
in defiance of the National League, then at war with the "outlaw," American
circuit.'-" The long overdue realignment to adjust to population shifts did not
commence until March 18, 1953, when the Boston Braves persuaded National
League rivals to consent to the transfer of the Boston club to Milwaukee.'
All other reported attempts to move franchises during the fifty intervening
years have been frustrated by interested competitors."' Shifts of minor league
to a non-major league city requires approval of five National League clubs; in the
American League, six. Unanimous consent of club, in both leagues is -till rmquired if the
transfer is to any city in the other major league. Sporting News, Dcc. 17, 1952, p. 7.
cols. 2-4.
127. Major-Minor League Rule l(a). HEAnIIr s, 1157-S.
128. Major-Minor League Rule 1 (b). HE.xux;S, 115. 'The last oeca'iun w,1t v hit a
league invaded "major league territory" %as in 1913 and 1914, when thw FLdcral League
was organized. This move, coupkd Lith the iijmasion of organizd .astalrb player
monopsony, touched off the costliest trade war in the game's hist',ry. Hot' - Rr-Tuca,
50-6.
129. Former Major League Rule l(c). Hraruxs, 1125.
130. HoUsE REPORT, 41, 190.
130a. N.Y. Times, March 19, 1953, p. 1, col. 2. The Braves secured umaniv -us cmip-j,
from other National League clubs and paid a reported $.0,00 to obtain the aprw:al ,i
the American Association. The cost of the transfer was minimized by the fact tiat tiz
Braves already owned the Milwaukee franchise in the Amerk-an Aswciation. Id. at p. 3,
col. 2.
131. In 1915 the Baltimore Federal League club proposed to buy the St. Louis
Cardinals and shift the franchise to Baltimore as part of the "peace treaty" which was
to end the Federal League war. Other National League clubs vetocd the plan, prompting
the Baltimore Federals to take their grievance all the %%ay to the Supreme Court.
HousE REPoir, 57. In the mid-Thirties, Frank Navin, president of the Detroit TigerE,
vetoed the Cardinals' plan to transfer their National League franchise to the Motor City.
HOUsE REPORT, 76. In 1941 the St. Louis Browns were in the process of completing plans
for a hop to Los Angeles when the war intervened. Before the war terminated, the Pacific
Coast League succeeded in amending the Major-Minor League Agreement to its prezent
form so as to make any revival of the plan a financial impossibility. I1id. Rccently the
Browns made two more futile attempts to move. They offerLd $.-'),0 tribute tu ite
Boston Braves for the opportmity of transferring the club to MiN. au!zue, territory
formerly "belonging" to the Braves' farm club in that city; but the Brave flatiy rejectel
the offer. N.Y. Times, March 4, 1953, p. 32, col. 5. Subsequently, the Browns made
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franchise invariably have been to areas without representation in organized
baseball. 182 Fifty years ago the St. Louis area could easily support two major
league entries. It was the second largest city in the country which permitted
games on Sunday, the day when patronage is the greatest. Today all the major
league clubs can play Sunday ball and St. Louis has the smallest population
per club in either league.133 Its clubs, consequently, have been the poorest at-
tendance-drawers over the past twenty-five years.134 The Cardinals have been
able to stay in pennant contention by living off their farm system,18 6 but the
Browns frequently have been forced to sell the contracts of capable players in
order to stay solvent.136
Relatively small population areas mean inferior attendance, inferior receipts,
and-unless outside money sources are available-inferior clubs. As clubs
become shabbier on the playing field, attendance falls off even more and the
vicious circle continues until the league finds an "angel" to pump new capital
into the franchise. Such has been the history over the past three decades in
St. Louis, Boston, Philadelphia, and Cincinnati, the "slums" of the major
leagues. 3 7
arrangements to shift their franchise to Baltimore, but this time five American League
rivals vetoed the plan. N.Y. Times, March 17, 1953, p. 32, col. 1. Thus, Bill Veeck, presi-
dent of the Browns, appears doomed to exhibit his club again to empty stands in St. Louis,
where by his own admission the Browns lost $400,000 in 1952. Daley, After the Knockout,
N.Y. Times, March 18, 1953, p. 42, col. 2. One can only guess as to the number of
other desired transfers which never got beyond the speculation stage due to the rules
on territorial rights.
132. In June, 1952, the Toledo club transferred to Charleston, W. Va., which had
been without professional baseball since the demise of the Central League in 1951. Sport-
ing News, June 18, 1952, p. 9, col. 5; June 25, p. 26, col. 4; July 2, p. 16, col. 3-5. This
was the first franchise shift in the American Association since 1914-15, whenthe Toledo
club was temporarily moved to Cleveland to discourage the occupancy of that city by
the Federal League. HEILBRONER BASEBALL BUmAu, LEAGUES AND LEAGUE CnniFs o
PROFESSioNAL BASEBALL 9 (1941). During 1952 there were four other franchise shifts
in the lower minor leagues to cities not represented in organized baseball. NATIONAL
AssociATmoN, 1952 HIGHLIGHTS passiin (1952).
133. HEAMNGS, 1696-7: HousE REFORT, 98-9, 191.
134. HOuSE REORT, 101; HrARINGs, 1595-8.
135. HousE REPORT, 95, 102-03.
136. "From 1947 to June 15, 1951, the Browns netted $1,296,000 in player transactions
with other major-league clubs, enabling its management to transform a $500,000 deficit
into a $600,000 profit"-after income taxes. HousE REPORT, 95. Bill Veeck, new president
of the Browns, unable to move the club and unwilling to sell its players, has sought to
equalize competitive conditions within the American League by increasing the visiting
club's share of receipts for games it helps produce in other cities. His chief proposal
-for home teams to share television receipts with the visiting club--was voted down.
And in retaliation the New York Yankees, Boston Red Sox, and Cleveland Indians
refused to book any night games in their parks with the Browns, thereby reducing
attendance and the Browns' road income even further. N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1953, p. 19,
col. 3; Feb. 1, 1953, § 5, p. 1, col. 4.
137. HousE REPoRT, 95, 99-103; HEARINGS, 1591-1609.
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Monopolizing patrons, profits, and pennants have been the clubs with the
fortuity of possessing franchises in large metropolitan areas.133 The three
New York clubs, for example, have ranked no lower than third in attend-
ance strength in their leagues since 1920 and have shared thirty-tvo pen-
nants.139 Profits of the New York Yankees from 1920 to 1950 approached
nine million dollars-more than six other American League rivals com-
bined.140 Other clubs with profitable markets protected from invasion by the
rules on territorial rights are the Detroit Tigers, Pittsburgh Pirates, Cleve-
land Indians, and Chicago Cubs.'-" Detroit and Pittsburgh each have larger
metropolitan areas than St Louis, which has two clubs.4'
Meanwhile, Los Angeles and San Francisco, two of the largest metropolitan
areas in North America, are without representation in the major leagues,
and, under existing rules, will remain "minor league" indefinitely. Baltimore,
Buffalo, Montreal, Toronto, and Minneapolis-St. Paul also have markets
larger than some present members of the "big time." Kansas City and Hous-
ton are approaching this level.' 43
Territorial rights have their adverse effects on fans, clubs, and players alike.
Fans in minor league cities which could support major league clubs with
relative ease are deprived of any opportunity to see championship games
played by the industry's top performers. Fans in other cities, now represented
in the majors, are doomed to witnessing perennial also-rans. Meanwhile,
clubs located in territory labeled "minor league" fifty years ago cannot ad-
vance to major leagte circles without the consent of every interested com-
petitor. Major league clubs with poor franchises are unable to move to greener
pastures except at prohibitive cost and consent of from four to fifteen rivals.
On the other hand, players of comparable ability receive widely discrepant
salaries solely because of the wide gulf between good franchises and bad.
Members of the last place Browns received half the salaries of players on the
last place Cubs in 1950, while members of the pennant winning Phillies earned
one-third less than their counterparts on the New York Yankees, who finished
first in the American League.'4
138. See note 137 supra.
139. Housa REPour, 101, 102. Much to the chagrin of fans outside of the Metro-
politan New York area, both the 1951 and 1952 World Series were "subway series." In
1951 the Yankees played the Giants for the world championship; last year they played
the Dodgers.
"Attendance strength," as the term was used by the Antitrust Subcommittee, is the
measure of each club's share of its league attendance after eliminating the variations due
to superior or inferior playing performance. Id. at 100-101.
140. HE.AmsS, 1601.
141. Id. at 1592, 1596-7, 1601. Profits of the Chicago White Sox have been half those
of the Chicago Cubs, perhaps due to the less desirable location of Comiskey park. Id. at
1601.
142. Id. at 93.
143. Id. at 93.
144. Id. at 1610.
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Exclusion of Competitors
The turbulent history of organized baseball has been marked by at least
thirteen commercial wars with disfavored or "outlaw" leagues. 145 The reasons
for these wars were two: either the independent league refused to recognize
existing "territorial rights" or else it refused to recognize organized base-
ball's monopsony on players' services. Frequently the independent committed
both sins.' 46 The outcome of these wars was either extinction of the inde-
pendent league 147 or its merger with organized baseball. 148 Only one league
which has questioned the industry monopsony has survived and retained a
semblance of independence. This lone survivor is the Mexican League.140
The tactics employed by organized baseball in these wars were boycotts,
player blacklists, price wars for players' services, legal harassment, and the
scheduling of conflicting games whenever the "outlaw" league had a club in
territory claimed by the self-appointed captains of the industry.1 0 By far
145. The first, between the National League and the old American Association in
1882, resulted in a truce which created the inter-league combination now called organized
baseball. These two leagues, supported by their minor league following, successfully
demolished the Union Association in 1884 and the Players League in 1890. A dispute in
dividing the player spoils after the demise of the Players League led to renewed war
between the National League and American Association in 1891. This war terminated
with the National League absorbing four clubs from its former ally and buying out the
remainder. Ten years' tranquillity ended in 1901 when the American League promoted
itself to major league status and fought the National League to a draw by 1903. Mean-
while, a revived American Association invaded forbidden minor league territory and won
reluctant acceptance into the National Association. The reorganized combination of major
and minor leagues subsequently forced into surrender the Tri-State (1907) and California
State (1909) leagues and eliminated a third outlaw, the Atlantic Association, in 1909.
After a two-year war, the major leagues bought out the Federal League in 1915.
Organized baseball's market monopoly has not been challenged since that time. Its
monopsony in the player market, however, has been disputed by three foreign leagues in
recent years: the Mexican League (1946), the Cuban Winter League (1946-47), and
the Quebec Provincial League (1947-48). Housz REORT, 26-9, 33-5, 38-42, 47-8, 50-7,
77-84; LANIGAN, BASEBALL CYcLOPEDIA 112-113 (1922).
146. Disputes over players were involved in all thirteen trade wars; rivalry over
consumer markets was an additional factor in the American Association war of 1882-83,
the Union Association war of 1884, the Players League war of 1890, the American Asso-
ciation war of 1891, the American League war of 1901-03, the American Association war
of 1902, and the Federal League war of 1914-15. Housz REo1RT, 26-9, 33-5, 38-42, 47-8,
50-7, 77-84; TultIN & TxompsoN, OFFICIAL BASEBALL ENcYCLO'EDIA 405 (1951).
147. Union Association (1884), Players League (1890), old American Association
(1891), Atlantic Association (1909), and Federal League (1915). HousE REroRT, 29,
35, 56-7.
148. Old American Association (1883), new American Association (1902), American
League (1903), Tri-State League (1907), California State League (1909), Cuban Winter
League (1947), and Quebec Provincial League (1949). HousE RmoRT, 26, 42, 47-8,
81, 82.
149. HousE REPoRT, 82
150. Id. at 35, 47, 79 (boycotts) ; 28, 47, 48, 51, 53, 77-81 (blacklists) ; 35, 40, 51-2,
55 (price wars) ; 34-5, 41, 54-5, 79 (legal harassment) ; 35 (conflicting schedule).
[Vol. 62 :576
MONOPSONY IN MANPOWER
the most effective weapon was the blacklist. Possessing a virtual monopsony
on the player supply, organized baseball threatened the blacklisting from three
years to life of any player who "jumped" his contract or ignored the reserve
rule. As a result, competing independents were forced to offer bankrupting
salaries in order to lure players to their clubs. 151 If players wavered before
these tempting offers, clubs in organized baseball were not adverse to offering
substantial salary increases to keep them in line.1 2 On a few occasions the
clubs induced players to break their contracts with independent leagues to
return to the ranks of organized baseball.'a 3
The last attempt to thwart the monopoly of organized baseball in the United
States was the Federal League war of 1914-15, a venture which cost its
backers $2,500,000.'5 Since that time, organized baseball has completely
dominated the American market-both in giving professional baseball e.%-
hibitions and in hiring professional baseball players. Various professional
Negro leagues have existed independently during this period, but due to the
151. Id. at 35, 40, 51-52, 55.
152. Ty Cobb's salary jumped from $12,000 to $20,000 during the Federal League
war. Walter Johnson's salary increased from $7,000 to $20,000. Id. at 52-3. Major
increases in salary scales have alays occurred during baseball price vmrs. Sometimes,
however, salaries tumbled when organized baseball succeeded in restoring its monopzony.
The following are salaries of players on the Philadelphia Phillies in 1839, v'hen the
club's reservations claims were unchallenged; in 1S92, after the cessation of t;o years
of free competition with independent leagues; and in 1893, when the club once more was
able to exercise its discretion:
18S9 1S92 193
Clements $2450 $3000 $I800
Delahanty 1750 2100 I00
Hallman 1400 3500 I800
Thompson 2500 3000 1800
Allen 3000 1800
Hamilton - 3400 10
Cross 3250 1800
Keefe 3500 1OO
Weyhing - 3250 1800
(Source: H. WRIGHT, NOTE AND AccouNT Booi:s, unpublished records in N.Y. Public
Library.)
153. Wade Killefer, catcher for Grover Cleveland Alexander, received c3,200 playing
for the Philadelphia Phillies in 1913. On January 8, 1914, he signed a three-year contract
with the Chicago Federals at $5,833.33 per season. Twelve days later he returned to his
reserving club, signing another three-year contract at $6,500 a season. Housn Rnro.r, 55.
Chicago failed to enjoin the breach of his Federal League contract. Weegluanv. Killefer,
215 Fed. 289 (6th Cir. 1914), affirming 215 Fed. 16S (D. Mich. 1914). See alo Housn
REPORT, 52-3. Such salary wars are not inconsistant with organized baseball's blacklisting
procedures, since a player does not become ineligible (i.e., blacklisted) until he has
actually violated his contract or reservation by playing on a forbidden club. Major
League Rule 15(a), HEARP-Gs, 1142; Major-Minor League Rule 15(a), Hutanxxcs, 1171;
National Association Agreement, § 21-01, HEAnixos, 1212; HousE REroRT, 23, 43, 77-.
154. HousE REPORT, 56.
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color ban in organized baseball there was no market conflict.10 Since 1945,
when the doors of organized baseball were opened to all races,150 the one
surviving Negro league, the Negro American League, has recognized both
contracts and reserve lists in return for similar guarantees from the ruling
bodies of organized baseball.157
Recent wars in the industry have occurred between organized baseball and
leagues in other countries. In 1946 the Mexican League offered tempting
bonuses and salaries to players in the major and high minor leagues who
would agree to play south of the border. Senator A. B. Chandler, organized
baseball's second commissioner, announced that any major leaguer who
jumped his contract or reserve clause would be barred from returning for
five years. As a result, only eighteen players ventured to accept offers from
the Mexican League. The Cuban Winter League also became "outlaw" when
it accepted these ineligible players for winter-time employment. Some players,
disliking living conditions in the tropics, sought asylum with the Canadian
Provincial League, and it too was labeled "outlaw." Other players attempted
to play for semi-pro clubs in the United States, only to find the blacklist posted
at every ball park controlled by organized baseball where they hoped to play
their exhibitions.'5
In 1947 organized baseball agreed to accept the Cuban Winter League as
an unclassified affiliate and to permit it to borrow a limited number of minor
league players each winter if it would bar its member clubs from contracting
with the Mexican League ineligibles. Similar pacts were made with winter
leagues in Panama, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela.150 A year later, Chandler
and the president of the Mexican League agreed not to tamper with each
other's players under contract or reservation, and the Canadian Provincial
League, the last of the "outlaws," entered organized baseball as a Class "C"
minor league. 160 As a result, virtually all professional baseball leagues in
America, from the equator to Hudson Bay, have subscribed by written or
oral agreement to the monopsonistic agreement of organized baseball not to
compete for players' services. 1 1
155. Negroes played in organized baseball in the 1880's. From 1887 to 1891, however,
the leagues introduced segregation into professional baseball and for over half a century
this color line was perpetuated by unwritten rules. CRAIG, ORGAzIZDm BAsMAI., 223-6
(unpublished thesis in Oberlin College Library, 1950).
156. Branch Rickey, then general manager of the Brooklyn Dodgers, signed Jackie
Robinson, second baseman of the Kansas City Monarchs, to a Montreal contract in
October, 1945. N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1945, p. 17, col. 1. Robinson thus became the first
Negro to play in organized baseball in 55 years, and he was soon followed by many more.
157. HEAINGS, 1295-6, 1548-50.
158. HouSE REPORT, 77-82.
159. Id. at 81.
160. Id. at 82.
161. In addition to the four "unclassified affiliates," there are two other winter
leagues in Central America: the Mexican Pacific Coast League and the Veracruz Winter
League. Sporting News, Dec. 17, 1952, p. 22, cols. 2-4. It is not known whether these
[Vol. 62: 576
]MONOPSONY IN MANPOI.ER
Organized baseball today is complete master of the national game. One
witness before the Antitrust Subcommittee characterized the combination as
a "government within a government."lG 2 This appears to be an understate-
ment. The intricate provisions of baseball law, formulated by sixteen major
league club owners and their minor league dependents and administered by
Comissioner Ford C. Frick, minor league president George M. Trautman,
and forty-five league presidents, rule the sport wherever it is played profes-
sionally in North and Central America.
ORGANIZED BASEBALL AND THE SHERMAix A-ct
The assault on organized baseball's monopsonistic position is primarily in
the hands of private parties. The justice Department and the Federal Trade
Commission have shown no inclination to act on behalf of the government.
The investigation by the House Antitrust Subcommittee focused publicity on
the combination, but congressional action was limited to pointed criticisms
of the status quo in the industry. Therefore, the fate of organized baseball's
restrictive practices will probably rest on the outcome of treble damage suits.
Two of the present actions are by blacklisted players 1ca and one by a former
minor league club owner, who allege damages arising from the reserve rule ;1-1
t-o organizations adhere to the industry's reserve rule. Even if they do not, however,
they pose no threat to organized baseball's player monopsony.
162. Testimony of Frederic A. Johnson, HFoxMos, 877-8, S35-6.
163. Prendergast v. Syracuse Baseball Club, Inc. ct at., No. 3936, X.D.N.Y., filed
April 30, 1951, is a suit by a pitcher who was blacklisted for refusing to accept the assign-
ment of his contract from Syracuse to Beaumont and a salary reduction from $1,100 per
month to $750 per month. Claiming $300,000 damages, Prendergast alleges that defend-
ants used the reserve clause and rules of organized baseball to deprive him of the reason-
able value of his services from 1936-51 and that, by blacklisting him, they deprived him
of his professional means of livelihood. Consideration of defendants' motions to dismiss
have been delayed pending the outcome of the Toolson and Kowalsi appeals.
Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc. ct al., 101 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951). aff'd per
c:riam, 200 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1952), is a suit by another pitcher who w,,as blacklisted for
refusing to accept the assignment of his services from Newark to Binghamton. Claiming
375,000 damages, Toolson alleges that defendants have combined to monopolize professional
baseball in the United States and, by blacklisting him, have deprived him of his means of
livelihood. Plaintiff filed a petition with the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, March
7, 1953, seeking review of the order dismissing the complaint, 21 U.S.L. W\CiVa 3233.
164. Corbett and El Paso Baseball Club, Inc. v. Chandler ctal., No. 2539, S.D. Ohio,
dismissed Jan. 25, 1952, aff'd, 6th Cir., Fed. 20, 1953. Corbett, former owner cf the
El Paso Baseball Club in the Class "C" Arizona-Texas League, contracted for the 1949
services of four players who had 1943 contracts with the Mexican League. Commissioner
Chandler at that time had a reciprocal agreement with the Me:dcan League to respect
reservation claims. President Trautman of the National Association enforced this agree-
ment and awarded the four players to the Mexican League. Claiming ,300,000 damages,
Corbett alleges that organized baseball is a monopoly based on the reserve rule which
has deprived the El Paso Club of the four players' services and the opportunity to sell
their contracts. Following the Sixth Circuits decision affirming the dismissal, Corbett's
attorney announced his intention to petition for a writ of certiorari. N.Y. Times, Feb.
21, 1953, p. 17, col. 1.
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another player's suit challenges the farm system as well.065 Should any of
these plaintiffs succeed, the number of treble damage suits may be expected
to soar; if they lose, organized baseball will relapse into an uneasy truce with
the antitrust laws.
Jurisdictional Issues
Three of the pending suits were dismissed by the district courts on the
ground that they lacked jurisdiction because of the 1922 Federal Baseball
case. 166 In that opinion, Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Supreme
Court, held that the business of presenting professional baseball exhibitions
for profit was neither interstate nor trade or commerce. Exhibitions, being
"purely state affairs," did not become interstate because of the "incidental"
interstate movement of clubs to play these games. Neither was the exhibition
"trade or commerce ... within the commonly accepted use of those words."
According to Holmes, "personal effort, not related to production, is not a
subject of commerce. 16 7 The breadth of this opinion has given organized
baseball an exemption which it would have been difficult for Congress to
match.
165. Kowalski v. Chandler et al., No. 2646, S.D. Ohio, dismissed Jan. 25, 1952,
aff'd, 6th Cir., Feb. 20, 1953. Kowalski, a minor league player since 1946, claims
$150,000 damages. He alleges that defendants used the draft restrictions and the uniform
contract containing the reserve clause to deprive him of the reasonable value of his
services and opportunities for promotion. Plaintiff's attorney intends to petition the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1953, p. 17, col. 1.
A fifth suit alleging $450,000 damages under the Sherman Act does not merit discus-
sion here. Tepler v. Frick et al., CCH TRADE REG. RE'. 1f 67, 331 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1952).
Tepler claimed that he injured his arm while pitching for Nashville in 1944 and that the de-
fendants, through the rules and regulations of organized baseball, reduced him to the status
of a chattel and were negligent in their care of him. Stated Judge Edelstein in dismissing
the complaint: "While there is a detailed description of a monopolistic system which, it
is said, reduces a baseball player to a status of peonage, the closest scrutiny of the
complaint does not disclose what acts these defendants performed in violation of the anti-
trust laws to the injury of the plaintiff. Actually, what seems to be alleged is that the
defendants are part of a monopoly and that they took action to the injury of the plaintiff.
However, I do not find the necessary allegation of damage to the plaintiff resulting proxi-
mately from the acts of the defendant which constitute violation of the antitrust laws."
Id. at p. 67, 796. The correctness of this position is incontrovertible. Baseball players are not
peons, Augusta Baseball Ass'n v. Thomasville Baseball Club, 147 Ga. 201,202-03, 93 S.E, 208
(1917) ; and the antitrust laws provide no remedy for damages unrelated to restraints of
competition in the market. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
166. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc. et. al., 101 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951),
aff'd per curian, 200 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1952); Corbett and El Paso Baseball Club,
Inc. v. Chandler et al., No. 2589, S.D. Ohio, Jan. 25, 1952, aff'd, 6th Cir., Feb, 20,
1953; Kowalski v. Chandler et al., No. 2646, S.D. Ohio, Jan. 25, 1952, aff'd, 6th Cir.,
Feb. 20, 1953.
167. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922).
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The Federal Baseball case stands today, a much-criticized relic of bygone
interpretations of the commerce clause.168 But it still stands. Until it is over-
ruled or distinguished, it will indefinitely perpetuate organized baseball's
intricately-woven monopsony, both as to the combination's economic power
and whatever abuses which may arise from the exercise of that power.
The criteria of interstate commerce employed by the Supreme Court in
the Federal Baseball case have been obsolete for more than fifteen years. Since
1937 the Supreme Court, reaffirming the broad doctrine of Gibbons v.
Ogden,6 9 has repeatedly asserted that any activity which crosses state
borders,170 any activity which uses the channels of interstate commerce,17'
or any local activity which even remotely affects other states or interstate
commerce 172 comes within the purview of the commerce power. On at least
four occasions the Supreme Court has emphasized that Congress, in enacting
the Sherman Act, exercised "all the power it possessed." 73 Therefore, tests
168. In the Gardella case, judge Frank characterized the Federal Baseball case as
an "impotent zombi." In his view, the Supreme Court "has overruled the precedents
upon which that decision was based," and further "the concept of commerce has
changed enough in the last two decades so that if that case were before the Supreme
Court de novo, it seems very likely that the Court would decide the other way." Gardella
v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 409 n.1 (2d Cir. 1949) (ccncurring opinion ). Judge Goddard
seemed quite reluctant to follow the 1922 dccision when he confronted the Gardella case
in the district courts. 79 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See also Topkis, Monopoly in
Professional Sports, 58 YALE L.J. 691 (1949) : Neville, Baseball and the Antitrust Laws,
16 ForeD L REv. 203 (1947) ; Note, 5 INTP-%A AL L REv. (X.Y.U.) 26 (1950).
169. 9 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1824). The power to regulate commerce among the states,
"like all others vested in congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution....
The wisdom and the discretion of congress, their identity with the people, and the influence
which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as
that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied to
secure them from its abuse. . . . Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic [i.e., trade in com-
modities], but it is something more-it is intercourse. It describes the commercial inter-
course between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches. . . . Comprehensive as
the word 'among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns
more states than one...." Id. at 196, 197, 189-90, 194.
170. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944);
Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944).
171. North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 6%, (1946) ; Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) ; Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
172. Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517
(1942) ; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); United States v. Rock Royal
Co-operative, 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
173. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932);
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940) ; United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries,
324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945). "The addition of the words 'or commerce among the several
States' [to the Sherman Act] . . . was the means used to relate the prohibited restraint
of trade to interstate commerce for constitutional purposes ... so that Congress, through
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of "direct" or "indirect" effects on interstate commerce, or the amount of
interstate business activity involved, if any, become irrelevant. 174
Application of present-day tests to the facts revealed by the recent con-
gressional investigation would indicate that organized baseball is unquestion-
ably an interstate activity. The business combination encompasses practically
every state in the union and, indeed, many foreign countries as well. While
the final exhibition which the consumer buys is a local affair, as in motion
picture exhibitions, operas, and other spectator amusements, interstate com-
merce is a necessary component of presenting such exhibitions. Every spring,
professional baseball clubs train for the championship season in the South
and present "barnstorming" exhibitions at whistle-stops along the way. The
championship season itself requires clubs to abide by a fixed schedule, neces-
sitating interstate transportation of both players and essential paraphernalia.
Players sign annual contracts which bind them to appear in every state where
the club has scheduled ganes. Negotiations for these contracts are usually
made across state lines, and the contracts themselves, being both assignable
and renewable under "baseball law," are articles of commerce which are
bought, sold, and bartered in interstate transactions. And finally, because of
the interdependence of baseball clubs blanketing the entire nation, the industry
is not amenable to effective state regulation. 75
The situation before the Court in the Federal Baseball case may also be
distinguishable from present conditions on two grounds. The increased com-
mercialization of baseball through radio and television, plus additional re-
straints on players caused by the farm system, render organized baseball quite
different today from thirty years ago. Either or both of these factors might
be held to impress an interstate character on the business even tinder the
obsolete Federal Baseball rationale.'70 The combination's monopsonistic agree-
ments affect the sale of radio and television rights, a market which accounts
for about fifteen percent of major league revenue. Furthermore, the sub-
stitution of the farm system for the universal draft has retarded the interstate
movement of players to better-paying clubs as their abilities warrant.
its commerce power, might suppress and penalize restraints on the competitive system
which involved or affected interstate commerce. . . . It was in this sense of preventing
restraints on commercial competition that Congress exercised 'all the power it possessed.' "
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940) (emphasis added).
174. Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236
(1948); Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 124-5 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941). "And
the amount of interstate or foreign trade involved is not material . . . since § 1 of the
Act brands as illegal the character of the restraint, not the amount of commerce affected."
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
175. See Houss REPoRT, 4-7.
176. See Note, 5 INTRAmuRAL L REv. (N.Y.U.) 206, 215-16 (1950). Judges
Learned Hand and Frank relied upon the radio and television features of organized base-




Professional baseball is not only interstate but also "trade or commerce"
within the meaning of the Sherman Act. The illusory distinction, urged by
organized baseball and adopted by the sixth and ninth circuit courts, that
professional baseball is sport and not trade or commerce, 177 finds no support
in recent Supreme Court decisions. The fact that professional baseball is a
sport in no manner detracts from the fact that it is also a business. Neither
the commerce clause nor the Sherman Act are limited to businesses dealing in
commodities. Enterprises dealing in services are likewise trade whether they
sell real estate brokerage,17 1 medical, 70 dry cleaning,8 0 or entertainment ser-
vices.1 8 ' Any doubts as to the Sherman Act covering service industries were
finally dispelled by United States v. Natimal Association of Real Estate
Boards,18 2 which endorsed Justice Story's oft-quoted definition of trade, made
in 1834:
"Wherever any occupation, employment, or business is carried
on for the purpose of profit or gain or a livelihood, not in the liberal
arts or in the learned professions, it is constantly called a trade."'l' 3
177. Corbett and El Paso Baseball Club, Inc. v. Chandler et al., 6-th Cir., Feb. 20,
1953; Kow.alsld v. Chandler et al., 6th Cir., Feb. 20, 1953; Toolson v. New York Yaniees,
Inc. et al., 200 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1952), aflfrmlni 101 F. Supp. 93, 94 (S.D. Cal. 1951) ;
Brief for Appellees, pp. 10-14, Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 200 F.2d 193 (9th
Cir. 1952); Brief for Appellees, pp. 10-14, Corbett and El Pao Baseball Club, Inc. v.
Chandler, 6th Cir., Feb. 20, 1953; Brief for Appellees, pp. 14-18, Kowalsld v. Chandler et al.,
6th Cir., Feb. 20, 1953. See also Ecder, Baseball-Sport or Commerce?, 17 U. oF Cr. L.
REv. 56, 65-S (1949). The source of this maxim is the Circuit Court holding in the Federal
Baseball case. Judge Smyth there asserted that the business of giving baseball exhibitions
"effects no exchange of things," and therefore, "The act is not trade or commerce-it is sbort.
The fact that the appellants produce baseball games as a source of profit, large or small, can
not change the character of the game. They are still sport, not trade." National League v.
Professional Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc., 269 Fed. 631, 634-5 (D.C. Cir. 1920).
178. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 4,5 (1950).
179. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
180. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 236 U.S. 4-27 (1932).
181. Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Marienelli, Ltd. v. United
Booking Offices of America, 227 Fed. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1914). See also Lorain Journal v.
United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (newspaper advertising); Charles A. Ranisay Co. v.
Associated Bill Posters, 260 U.S. 501 (1922) (billboard advertising); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941) (automobile financing); United
States v. Local Union No. 639, 32 F. Supp. 594 (D.D.C. 1940) (building construction);
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (insurance);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (news services); United States v.
Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1943), aff'd (by an equally divided court), 330 U.S.
806 (1947) (pullman services) ; United States v. Northern Securities Co., 193 U.S. 197
(1904) (railroad services) ; United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (taxi
services); Anderson v. Shipowners' Ass'n of Pacific Coast, 272 U.S. 359 (1926) (shipping
services) ; Mercer v. United States, 61 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1932) (trucking services).
182. 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
183. Id. at 490-1, quoting The Schooner Nymph, IS Fed. Cas. No. 10,32, at 507
(C.C.D. Me. 1834).
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Despite the obsolescence of the legal doctrines in the Fcderal Baseball
case,1 8 4 the courts may be tempted to reaffirm it on policy considerations.
Senator George Wharton Pepper, who represented organized baseball in its
successful fight for antitrust immunity thirty years ago, used essentially a
184. This obsolescence is perhaps best demonstrated by comparison of the language
of the Federal Baseball case with more recent Supreme Court decisions:
"The business is giving exhibitions of
baseball, which are purely state affairs."
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc.
v. National League, 259 U.S. 200, 209
(1922).
"It is true that in order to attain for
these exhibitions the great popularity that
they have achieved, competitions must be
arranged between clubs from different
cities and States. But the fact that in
order to give the exhibitions the Leagues
must induce free persons to cross state
lines and must arrange and pay for their
doing so is not enough to change the
character of the business." Id. at 208-9.
"According to the distinction insisted upon
in Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648,
655, . . . the transport is mere incident,
not the essential thing." Id. at 209.
"That to which it is incident, the exhi-
bition, although made for money would
not be called trade or commerce in the
commonly accepted use of those words.
As it is put by the defendant, personal
effort, not related to production, is not
a subject of commerce." Ibid.
"The showing of motion pictures is of
course a local affair. But ... the course
of business which involves a regular ex-
change of films in interstate commerce iq
adequate to bring the exhibitors within
the reach of the Sherman Act." United
States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323
U.S. 173, 183-4 (1944).
"Whatever, was the ultimate object of
this conspiracy, the means adopted for its
accomplishment reach beyond the boun-
daries of Colorado." United States v.
Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 298
(1945).
(In holding the Hooper case inapposite
to the Sherman Act:) "In short, a nation-
wide business is not deprived of its inter-
state character merely because it is built
upon sales contracts which are local in
nature. Were the rule otherwise, few
businesses could be said to be engaged
in interstate commerce." United States
v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322
U.S. 533, 547 (1944).
"IT]here is an obvious distinction to be
drawn between a course of conduct wholly
within a state and conduct which is an
inseparable element of a larger program
dependent for its success upon activity
which affects commerce between the
states." United States v. Frankfort Distil-
leries, supra, at 297.
"Whatever other meaning 'commerce'
may have included in 1787, the diction-
aries, encyclopedias, and other books of
the period show that it included trade:
business in which persons bought and
sold, bargained and contracted. And this
meaning has persisted to modern times."
United States v. South-Eastern Under-
writers Ass'n, supra, at 549.
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policy approach. In his argument before the Supreme Court, April 19, 1922,
the eve of the playing season, he claimed that the very existence of the na-
tional pastime, from the Class D leagues to the World Series, was at stake.
He asserted that the Sherman Act should apply only to businesses which
might be conducted with or without restraints because the Act was based on
the economic theory that separate, competitive production, in the long run,
resulted in greater public advantage--through lower prices and better prod-
ucts-than where monopoly or combinations existed. This theory, he claimed,
collapsed when applied to professional sports such as baseball.158
Today, defenders of organized baseball are following the same line of argu-
ment. They contend that baseball, like other team sports, faces problems unique
in the realm of business; that the sport demands restraints on economic com-
petition if it is to survive as an amusement industry; and implicitly that the
industry merits special consideration under the antitrust laws.1 65 The asser-
tion that professional baseball is "sport not commerce" appears to be one
manifestation of this approach.
Even assuming the accuracy of this premise, re-endorsement of the Federal
Baseball case on policy grounds contains two fatal errors. It would grant
carte blanche immunity to all restraints on competition in professional base-
ball, whether or not they arose from the unique character of the industry. It
would also be a clear usurpation of the policy-making function of Congress,
a committee of which declared in May, 1952. that the sport warranted no
absolute immunity from the antitrust laws.187
Even if the Federal Baseball case should be overruled or distinguished, or-
ganized baseball contends that monopsonistic restraints involving employment
services as distinguished from monopolistic restraints in marketing consumer's
services are not "restraints of trade" within the meaning of the Sherman
Act. The industry claims that the antitrust laws were enacted solely in the
interest of the public as consumers and hence proscribed only those restraints
which tended to raise the price of services sold to the consuming public. It
further contends that Section 6 of the Clayton Act,189 properly construed,
declares that employers' monopsony agreements are not prohibited restraints
185. Brief for Respondent, passhn. Federal Baseball case, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). Chief
Justice Taft, who joined in the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court, had ly.cn ap-
proached by organized baseball in 1918 to become the first commissioner. He announced
his availability for the post, but the American League balked at the plan and he was never
named. HousE RE'oRT, 58.
186. "As appellees view it, the very existence of professional baseball in this country,
at least along the lines upon which it has been conducted during the last three quarters
of a century, is at stake. If the appellant can successfully maintain his present action, the
continued conduct of the sport will be seriously imperiled, to the detriment of the public,
the baseball leagues and dubs, and the thousands of professional baseball players." Brief
for Appellees, p. 5, Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 200 F2d 193 (9th Cir. 1952).
See also id. at p. 17.
187. HousE RESoRT, 230-1.
188. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1946).
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of trade. And it finally claims that player grievances against their employers'
monopsony agreements arise from "labor disputes" and therefore, by Section
20 of the Clayton Act '" and the Norris-LaGuardia Act,10 that relief under
the Sherman Act is prohibited.19
A literal reading of the labor amendments to the Sherman Act contained
in the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia acts offers some support to this posi-
tion. Section 6 of the Clayton Act opens with the declaration "that the labor
of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce." 102 Section 20
of the same act reads in part:
"No restraining order or injunction shall be granted . . . in any
case ... between employers and employees ... involving, or grow-
ing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employ-
ment....
"And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any
person or persons, whether singly or in concert ... from ceasing to
patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or from recom-
mending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means
so to do; . . . nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be
considered or held to be violations of any law of the United
States."193
The Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes injunctive relief for certain specified
acts in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute.10 4 "Labor
disputes" are defined as "any controversy concerning terms or conditions of
employment ... between one or more employers or associations of employers
and one or more employees . . . regardless of whether or not the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."'105 In construing
these labor provisions, the Supreme Court has declared that the Sherman Act,
Section 20 of the Clayton Act, and the Ndrris-LaGuardia Act are three in-
terlacing statutes which are to be read together. The broader definition of
189. 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1946).
190. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1946).
191. Brief for Appellees, pp. 43-63, Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 200 F.2d
198 (9th Cir. 1952) ; Brief for Appellees, pp. 35-39, Corbett and El Paso Baseball Club,
Inc. v. Chandler, 6th Cir., Feb. 20, 1953; Brief for Appellees, pp. 21-6, 39-47, Iowalskl
v. Chandler, 6th Cir., Feb. 20, 1953. These arguments rely principally upon language
appearing in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495-7, 502-03 (1940), and cited
in several lower court opinions, including Schatte v. International Alliance, 182 F.2d
158, 167 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th
Cir. 1951) ; United States v. Gold, 115 F.2d 236, 238 (2d Cir. 1940) ; United States v,
San Francisco Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 57 F. Supp. 57, 60-3. (N.D. Cal. 1944).
Unlike the situation in organized baseball, all of these cases arose out of labor union
activity.
192. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1946).
193. 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1946) (emphasis added).
194. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1946).
195. 47 STAT. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 113(a), 113(c) (1946).
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"labor dispute" under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, therefore, is applicable in
construing Section 20 of the Clayton Act.1
0
The contention of organized baseball, if upheld, would give all corporations
antitrust immunity to agree not to compete for workers' services, to suppress
wages, and, by blacklisting, to deprive workers of an opportunity to pursue
their livelihood. Such a construction of the antitrust laws is unsupported by
either the statutory history or the Supreme Court's interpretation of these
enactments. Throughout the congressional debates on the Sherman Act, there
was not a single voice raised to indicate an intent to exempt employers' re-
strictive agreements.' 07 In fact, Congress purposely drafted the Sherman Act
in familiar common law terms so as to incorporate into federal law the exist-
ing concepts of restraint of trade.108 'Monopsonistic agreements among em-
ployers in a particular trade to fix or depress the price of labor or to inter-
fere with workers' free market opportunities were void at common law as
contracts in restraint of trade.103 Likewise, concerted action by employers
to regulate wages were unlawful criminal or civil conspiracies if their objective
was to depress the price of labor below the free market level. Only when
workers combined to raise wages artificially were employers privileged to
196. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231-2 (1941).
197. On the contrary, Senator Edmunds, chairman of the committee drafting the
final version of the Sherman Act, expressed his opinion on the floor of the Senate that
exemption for all labor union activity was unnecessary because the act prohibited com-
binations of capital which could regulate or depress the price of labor. BERMiA:, Ira: --
AND THE SHEMXAN Acr 25-6 (1930). Berman's conclusion is that Congress intended
the act to apply against trusts and not against labor unions. Id. at 53.
198. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 497-8 (1940).
199. The leading case was Hilton v. Eckersly, 6 E. & B. 47 (Q.B. 18551, aff'd 6 E. &
B. 66 (Ex. 1856), which held a contract among eighteen Lancaster employers in the cott_,n
textile trade to conform to uniform wage, hour, and disciplinary practices for one year to be
a restraint of trade. The court asserted that the economic power of employers to depress
w.-ages was contrary to public policy, regardless of whether the employees themselves
were organized. The Hilton case was followed by Mineral Water Bottle Exchange &
Trade Protection Soc. v. Booth, 36 Ch. D. 465 (1887), which held in restraint of trade
a contract among 179 employers agreeing not to hire employees within two years after
leaving the service of a competitor.
The Hilton doctrine was recognized as the common law in the United States at the time
of the Sherman Act: Huston v. Reutlinger, 91 Ky. 333, 15 S.W. 867 (1891) (restraint
of trade for Louisville employers in insurance trade to agree to limit freedom of employ-
ment and to fix wages) ; People ex rel. McIlhaney v. Chicago Live Stock Exchange, 170
Ill. 556, 48 N.E. 1062 (1897). Cf. People ex rel. Gray v. Medical Society of County of
Erie, 24 Barb. Ch. 570 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857). See also REsTATEIfMfT, CorAcrs A
515(c), Illustrations 20-22 (1933) ; 6 CoRnix, Cox mcvs 556, 561 (1951). Legal recogni-
tion of labor's right to combine led to a modification of this common law doctrine. Where
employees combined in unions for the purpose of raising wages, employers became privi-
leged to combine in associations to the degree necessary to place bargaining power on
a parity. See Notes, 25 CoL. L. RE. 647 (1925), 26 Co. L. R. 344 (1926) ; and nte
200 infra. To this degree employers' associations may be permissible under the Sherman
Act.
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combine in retaliation.2 0 Blacklisting or boycotting, when it deprived workers
of an opportunity to pursue their calling or when it prevented competitors
from securing unemployed workers, was also condemned.20 1
Both federal courts and contemporary commentators early recognized that
the Sherman Act applied to employers' activities in restraint of trade.
2 0 2
Limited only by the scope of the commerce power,2 0 3 federal courts invoked
the Sherman Act against monopsonistic agreements in restraint of trade in
the employment market.2 °4
Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act resulted from widespread use of the
Sherman Act to combat strikes. These sections were intended to remedy
court interpretations of the Sherman Act which, in the opinion of Congress,
had been unduly severe on combinations of laborers.2 0 5  Neither the com-
200. "[A]n association is criminal when its object is to depress the price of labour
below what it would bring if it were left without artificial excitement by either masters
or journeymen to take its chance in the market, [but] . .. a combination to resist
oppression, not merely supposed but real, would be perfectly innocent; for where the
act to be done and the means of accomplishing it are lawful and the object to be attained
is meritorious, combination is not conspiracy." Gibson, J., Commonvealth ex rel.
Chew v. Carlisle, 1 Bright 36, 42 (Pa. 1821). CI. Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. 420, 430, 28
Atl. 190, 193 (1894) : "The combination of the employers . . .was not to interfere with
the price of labor as determined by the common law theory, but to defend themselves
against a demand made altogether regardless of the price, as regulated by the supply.
The element of an unlawful combination to restrain trade because of greed or profit to
themselves, or of malice toward plaintiff or others is lacking, and this is the essential
element of which are founded all decisions as to common law conspiracy in this class
of cases. And however unchanged may be the law as to combination of employers to
interfere with wages, where such combinations take the initiative, they certainly do not
depress a market price when they combine to resist a combination to artificially advance
price."
201. Mattison v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 3 Ohio Dec. 526 (1895); Blumenthal
v. Shaw, 77 Fed. 954 (3rd Cir. 1897). Problems of proving a conspiracy to blacklist
were difficult, however. See, e.g., Bradley v. Pierson, 148 Pa. 502, 24 Atl. 65 (1892).
202. See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 279, 290
(6th Cir. 1898), citing Hilton v. Eckersley; STImsoN, HANDBoIO OF LABOR LAW, 185-6,
205, 222, 337, 339, 346, 347 (1896). See also 6 CoaniN, COwRACrS § 1401 (1951).
203. Federal Baseball case, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Hart v. B. F. Keith Vaudeville
Exchange, 12 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 704 (1927).
204. Marienelli, Ltd. v. United Booking Offices of America, 227 Fed. 165 (S.D.N.Y
1914); Anderson v. Shipowners' Ass'n of Pacific Coast, 272 U.S. 359 (1926). In Ander-
son's brief to the Supreme Court, he relied heavily upon both the Marienelli and Hilton
cases. Brief for Appellant, pp. 26-8, 32-7. The shipowners urged in vain that their
agreement was a restraint on employment, not "commerce," and therefore not subject
to the Sherman Act. Brief for Respondent Against Granting Certiorari, p. 10; Brief for
Respondent, p. 21.
205. "In this pending bill, disguise it as we may, dodge and evade as we may, there
is one great question we must meet and settle, and that is the question as to whether
this proposed law shall be directed against the combination of capital that the Sherman
antitrust law was designed to be directed against or whether the antitrust laws shall
be shifted, partially at least and turned as an engine of oppression and destruction
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mittee reports nor the congressional debates reveal any intent to exempt
employers' restrictive agreements. In fact, the debates frequently contained
condemnations of the power of "trusts" and other combinations of capital to
depress the price of labor and exploit the working man.2003
In Section 6, Congress intended to grant associations of workers and
farmers the same right to act collectively which investors enjoyed through
the corporate business unit.2 0" The declared policy of this section was to
reassert the basic purpose of the Sherman Act, which was directed not
against restraints of competition among farmers and workingmen who had
nothing to sell but the products of their own labor, but against restraints on
competition among firms which bought such services or commodities at de-
pressed prices and sold them in the same or altered form to the consuming
public at artificially high prices.2 0 S Culminating prolonged consideration of
this section by both houses, the Senate added the controversial first sentence,
against some of the very people they are designed to protect... [T]he very law that
was intended to be used to curb monopolies and to preserve equality of oppwortunity among the
American people has been used as a means of annoying, harassing, vexing, and in many in-
stances oppressing a large number of the very people the makers of the law declared it shuuld
not be used against-the laborers." Sen. Ashurst (Ariz.), 51 Co.G. R C. 13663, 13t6
(1914). For similar pronouncements, see 51 id. at 9540, 9546-7.
206. "Wk hat is a monopoly and what is its source of power tu oppress? It is
created by welding together all of the industries which produce any article and placing
this combination under one control.... The monopoly being the only employer of the
kind of labor required in the production of the article which it alone produces, can and
does say what such labor will be paid as wages.... The workman skilled only in making
the thing sold by the monopoly must accept the wages it offers or do without and try
to learn some other business." Rep. Crosser (Ohio), 51 CoNG. Rr c. 9555 (1914). See ahq
e.g., 51 id. at 9154, 9543, 9552.
207. H.R. RE:P. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-16 (1914); SEr-. Rn'. No. 69S, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess. 10-12 (1914) ; 51 CO2G. RE:c. 90z6-7, 9165-6, 9171-4, 9249, 9549, 13N2-7,
13844-8, 13909-11, 13918, 14020-1, 14214 (1914).
20S. "The only organizations which should be excluded from the operation of the
antitrust laws are those where labor is the basis or one of the chief factors in the
organization, as in the case of labor organizations proper, and in agricultural and horti-
cultural organizations. The Committee rest this distinction upon the broad ground that
labor is not, and ought not to be regarded as, a commodity within the purview of the
antitrust laws." SEN. RE. No. 693, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1914). The remarks of
Rep. Barkley (Ky.) were typical of those made on the floor of Congress: "So suc-
cessful have these great combinations of wealth been in the past, not only in their
organization but also in their operation, that we are now compelled to buy much that
we buy from a trust, and to sell to a trust much that we have to sell. This condition
in the past has enabled the trust and monopoly to fix the price of the thing it bought
from us and the thing it sold to us, the result being that the real producer and the real
consumer have both been at the mercy of these great aggregations of w.ealth.... [Sec-
tion 6] gives to labor and agriculture what it asks and is entitled to. It recognizes
the difference between the man whose only asset is his power to work and the men -,ho
seek to use labor and the products of labor for monopolistic purposes." 51 Co:.-G. R'Ec.
9552, 9554 (1914). See also 51 CoNG. REc. 9541, 9554, 955, 9559, 9.50, 1367, 1401w,
14587 (1914).
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which purportedly clarified this congressional policy: "That the labor of a
human being is not a commodity or article of commerce."2 0
In Section 20, Congress specified the practices which labor unions could
employ without violating the antitrust laws or any other federal law. This
section incorporated that line of judicial decisions which Congress thought
best described the legitimate practices of labor organizations. As both the
House and Senate committee reports stated:
"The consensus of judicial view, as expressed in these cases and
others which might be cited, is that workingmen may lawfully com-
bine to further their material interests without limit or constraint,
and may for that purpose adopt any means or methods which are
lawful. It is the enjoyment and exercise of that right and none other
that this bill forbids the courts to interfere with."210
Congress addressed Section 20 solely to concerted action by labor organi-
zations "concerning terms or conditions of employment." 211 The floor man-
ager of the bill in the House of Representatives explained that this section
"covers in a proper way, we think, every possible angle of the strike situa-
tion. '212 Congress gave no consideration to employers' agreements not to
compete, which had nothing to do with the collective bargaining situation.
The Senate Judiciary Committee declared that it added the phrase, "whether
singly or in concert," merely to ensure the right of workers to act together in
pursuing their strike activities.213
209. The first sentence was formally proposed as an amendment by Sen. Culberson
(Texas), floor manager of the bill in the Senate, 51 CONG. REc. 14590 (1914), and was
adopted by a voice vote, 51 id. at 14591. Rep. Webb (N. Car.), floor manager in the
House, commented: "Of course that is a mere legislative declaration or postulate. I do
not think it does any harm. I do not know that it does any good. Your conferees agreed
to let it remain." 51 id. at 16276. See also 6 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS 561 (1951).
210. H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1914); SEN. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. 30 (1914) (emphasis added).
211. 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1946).
212. 51 CONG. REC. 9660 (1914). Rep. Webb further explained that the word "others"
was confined to the parties to the labor dispute. 51 id. at 9652-3. To allay the fears
of the AFL that unions' strike activities, immune from attack by injunction, might
still lead to treble damage actions, Webb introduced as a committee amendment the final
clause of what became § 20. 51 CONG. Rxc. 9652 (1914), adopted by voice vote, 51 id. at 9662,
213. SEN. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1914). Both proponents and op-
ponents of the bill as finally worded appeared to recognize that §§ 6 and 20 were intended
only to bestow favors on organized labor. As Rep. Webb summarized these two sections:
"This is a codification of labor's rights, to apply to the .whole United States.... I think
the two sections constitute labor's bill of rights that they have been clamoring for for 25
years; and we have written into the statute law what is considered to be the best opinions
of the courts as to labor and labor's rights." 51 CoNG. REc. 16279 (1914). Other congress-
men echoed these sentiments, including Rep. Floyd (Ark.), who said: "The provisions of the
bill relating to labor greatly restrict the power heretofore exercised by big corporations
and combinations over laboring men and labor organizations, often by the improper use
of injunctions." 51 id. at 16321.
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Seventeen years later, Congress again responded to labor's cries of anti-
trust harassment and passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act "to protect the rights
of labor in the same manner as the Congress intended when it enacted the
Clayton Act, which act by reason of its construction and application by the
Federal courts, is ineffectual to accomplish the congressional intent."2 14 To
remove any doubt as to the construction to be placed on the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, Congress included a statement of public policy, described as a refinement
of the first sentence of Section 6 of the Clayton Act:215
"Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with
the aid of governmental authority for owners of property to organize
in the corporate and other forms of ownership association, the in-
dividual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual
liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby
to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore,
though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it
is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organiza-
tion, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to
negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment .... therefore,
the following definitions of, and limitations upon, the jurisdiction
and authority of the courts of the United States are hereby en-
acted."216
If employers are in any way exempt from the antitrust laws, it appears
clear from this statement of congressional intent that this exemption is limited
to activities in the course of collective bargaining. In the Clayton and Norris-
LaGuardia acts, Congress has declared that labor unions and employers
should be free to bargain concerning terms and conditions of employment
without the threat of antitrust harassment. Activities of self-help in such
"labor disputes," therefore, are outside the compass of the Sherman Act. But
to label organized baseball's player monopsony as an activity arising from
a labor dispute seems to be directly contrary to this expressed statement of
public policy and unsupported by fact. Blacklisted players are parties to no
labor dispute. They are not attempting to reach agreement on terms of em-
ployment with their reserving club. On the contrary, they are blacklisted
because they wish to leave their reserving club for employment elsewhere.
Furthermore, the uniform player's contract is an employers' contract, framed
for and by the club owners without negotiation or even consultation with the
players. Under such circumstances disputes "concerning the terms and con-
dition of employment" are patently impossible. The player must accept the
uniform contract offered him or be blacklisted.
Finally, there is no unionization in professional baseball and hence no col-
lective bargaining. Every attempt to organize a players' union has been an
utter failure, due both to the dub owners' monopsony agreements and to the
214. H.R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1931).
215. Id. at 6.
216. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1946).
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migratory and seasonal character of the profession.217 The Clayton and
Norris-LaGuardia acts, like the common law,218 appear to accept the premise
that where employees act in concert to bargain collectively, it is reasonable for
employers likewise to organize so as to meet them on equal terms.
210 flow-
ever, where there is no unionization, the only pretext for such combinations
is lacking. Judicial acceptance of the statutory construction urged by or-
ganized baseball would leave the unorganized worker without any redress
under federal law. The National Labor Relations Act is concerned only with
problems related to collective bargaining.220 Employees who choose not to
unionize, therefore, are restricted to relief under the Sherman Act or no relief
at all.
Organized baseball relies principally upon Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader 221
for support in its contention that the Sherman Act does not apply to restraints
involving employment services or "labor competition," as distinguished from
"commercial competition." 222 In the Ape.xr case, the Supreme Court empha-
sized that the Sherman Act "was not aimed at policing interstate transporta-
tion or movement of goods and property." 2 3 "The end sought was the pre-
vention of restraints to free competition in business and commercial trans-
actions." 4 To the extent the opinion differentiated between "labor com-
petition" and "commercial competition," there is nothing to indicate that such
differentiation went beyond recognizing that labor unions under Section 6
of the Clayton Act are not in themselves combinations in restraint of trade.="0
From the point of view of corporations, however, there is no reason for dis-
tinguishing competitive restraints in the buying of employment services from
restraints in the purchase of any other factor of production. The statutory
history of the antitrust laws is void of any such suggestion. And, as the his-
tory of organized baseball indicates, commercial monopolies may be perfected
as easily by restraints in the labor market as by restraints in any other market.
Only where employers form associations for the purpose of facilitating col-
lective bargaining negotiations with labor unions would there appear to be
217. See page 635 and note 296 infra. Since 1946 the major league club owners have
solicited the expression of grievances from representatives elected by major league players,
but no collective bargaining machinery has been established. The Antitrust Subcommittee
described the present system of player representatives as being "of little consequence."
Houss REPORT, 175-7.
218. See note 199 mipra.
219. See, e.g., United States v. San Francisco Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 57 F.
Supp. 57, 60-3 (N.D. Cal. 1944).
220. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 140 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. 1952).
221. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
222. See note 191 supra.
223. 310 U.S. 469, 490 (1940).
224. Id. at 493. See also id. at 495-7.
225. See id. at 502-3.
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the reasonable type of restraint which the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia acts
exempt from the antitrust laws.2 26
Viewed in the setting of legislative intent, neither the Clayton Act nor the
Norris-LaGuardia Act provide any relief to traditional restraints of trade by
combinations of employers. Whenever these labor provisions have been urged
to justify boycotts, blacklists, or other restraints of trade by employers, the
Supreme Court has firmly rejected such claims. 2 7 In the Allen Bradley case,
the Supreme Court declared that the antitrust laws contained two congres-
sional policies: "The one seeks to preserve a competitive business economy;
the other to preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its conditions
through the agency of collective bargaining." - 8 It is difficult to perceive
how employers' agreements tending to defeat both of these policies could
be held exempted from the Sherman Act. "Seldom, if ever," the Supreme
Court noted in the Allen Bradley case, "has it been claimed before, that by
permitting labor unions to carry on their own activities, Congress intended
completely to abdicate its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce
and to empower interested business groups to shift our society from a com-
petitive to a monopolistic economy."22  What the Supreme Court said in
United States v. Women's Sportswear Manufacturers Association seems
equally applicable to organized baseball: the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia
acts "cannot be utilized as a cat's-paw to pull employers' chestnuts out of the
antitrust fires."' ' s
The Merits
Once the jurisdictional hurdle is mastered, proof of any existing Sherman
Act violations should be relatively easy. 'Most of the agreements of organized
baseball and the modes of enforcing such agreements are a matter of public
record. The industry operates in a goldfish bowl, with every move of club
owners, league officials, Commissioner, and minor league president docu-
mented daily in the public press. To prove that the combination violates
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, plaintiffs must establish that organized baseball
unreasonably restrains competition..2 3 1 To obtain treble damages or equitable
226. See note 219 supra.
227. United States v. Women's Sportswear M6frs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949) ; Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945). See also United States v.
National Ass'n of Window Glass 11frs., 287 Fed. 228 (N.D. Ohio) (agreement Ltw cen
manufacturers of handblovn window glass and union, fixing wages and dividing labor
market), rez'd on other grounds, 263 U.S. 403 (1923).
228. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797, E06 (1945).
229. Id. at 810. "There is ... one line which we can draw with assurance that .%,e
follow the congressional purpose. We know that Congress feared the concentrated power
of business organizations to dominate markets and prices. It intended to outlaw business
monopolies." Id. at 811.
230. 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
231. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55 (1911). Of courEe
certain policies or practices were recognized-in the Slandard Oil case and since-as so
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relief, the complaining parties must further show that the restraint has caused
injury to them.23 2
Monopsony in the player market. The reserve rule, aptly described as the
foundation of organized baseball, appears to fall squarely within the doctrine
of U ited States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co. 233 This case held that all agree-
ments to manipulate prices are conclusively unreasonable restraints on com-
- petition prohibited by Section 1 of the Sherman Act. "No showing of so-
called competitive abuses or evils which these agreements were designed to
eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense. '23 4
The reserve rule virtually eliminates competition in the purchase of players'
services. Players under contract or reservation may be approached by only
one buyer, and if they dislike the terms offered, they are unable to sell their
skilled services to anyone else. This agreement not to compete in effect allows
each club to set its own prices in the player market.
While most of the price-manipulation cases. including the Socony Vacuum
case, involved the purchase 235 or sale 230 of commodities rather than services,
there is nothing in the history of restraints of trade under the Sherman Act
to render the distinction significant. The Sherman Act encompasses those
restraints of trade which were void and unenforceable at common law. One of
the oldest of these was an agreement which prevented a person from freely
dangerous as to be considered conclusively unreasonable or illegal per se: price-fixing
and division of markets, id. at 65, United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 397-
402 (1927) ; boycotts and abuse of patents. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334
U.S. 495, 522-3 (1948).
232. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1946). On the use of the antitrust laws for relief by private
parties generally, see Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of
Development of the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010 (1952).
233. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
234. Id. at 218. Cf. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
235. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219 (1948); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United
States v. Ozark Canners Ass'n, 51 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Ark. 1943). Bit cf. Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940): "The end sought [by the Sherman Act] was
the prevention of restraints to free competition in business and commercial transactions
which tended to restrict production, raise prices or 'otherwise control the market to the
detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services, all of which had come to be
regarded as a special form of public injury." Implications of this dictum that the Sherman
Act applied only to restraints of a monopolistic nature were squelched in the Mandeville
case, supra, at 236: "The statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or to
purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers. Nor does it immunize the outlawed acts
because they are done by any one of these." The original draft of § 6 of the Clayton Act
included an antitrust exemption for consumers' associations. "Consumers" was stricken
from the bill by the Senate Judiciary Committee because it "is susceptible of much abuse
if in the unrestricted sense it is applied ... to all character of consumers, including
corporations generally." SEx. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1914).
236. See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211
(1951) ; United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945) ; United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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exercising his calling. 7 One variety of this common law restraint of trade
was an agreement among competing employers to fix prices and other terms
of employment.3 8 That the Sherman Act encompassed such monopsonistic
agreements became clear in both the Maricnelli and Anderson cases. -' 0 The
latter involved a combination of Pacific Coast shipowners wlich allegedly fixed
the wages of seamen, assigned them to particular vessels, and blacklisted those
who did not comply with the association's rules. In finding that the complaint
stated a cause of action, the Supreme Court declared: "The purpose of the
Sherman Act is . . . to preserve the right of freedom of trade... . [T]he
effect of the combination now under consideration, both as to the seamen and
the owners, is precisely what [the Act] condemns."2410
The original purpose of the reserve rule was to reduce player salaries, and
that has been its necessary effect. Even though the agreement be considered
237. Opinion of Learned Hand, J., Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 403 (1949).
In the Dyer's Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. V, f. 5, pl. 26 (1415), an emplbyment ct, ntract, in
which defendant dyer agreed not to exercise his calling within the plaintiff's town for
six months, was held void as a restraint of trade. Commented the court: "And, per Dieu,
if the plaintiff were here he should go to prison until he paid a fine to the King." See
also anonymous case, Moore 115, 72 Eng. Rep. 476 (KB. 1578), htilding in re traint of trad.
an agreement by an apprentice not to employ his craft in Nottingham for four years. The
"rule of reason" was introduced by Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347
(Ch. 1711). Voluntary restraints, when ancillary to contracts of emlployifnLt or the sale of
a business, were valid if the restraint w;as reasonable, i.e., if the restraint on the empkyee's k.r
seller's freedom of trade was no broader in scope, both as to time and area, than vas
reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer or purchaser. NWhtcre the voluntary
restraint was general, or if the restraint w.as involuntary (i.e., restrained freedom of
trade of one not a party to the agreement), the contract wa.s conclusively void. See
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1S93); HArr-u.,
CAsEs AND MALTEIALS ON TRADE REtuLATioN 146-91 (1951) ; 0 CoInu, Com.UCrs §§
1383, 1394 (1951); Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Yot to Compete, 76 U. oF PA. L.
REv. 244, 266-71 (1928). Some states have statutes eliminating application of the rule
of reason to agreements not to compete which are ancillary to personal service contracts.
Such statutes declare that: "Every contract by which one is restrained from exercising
a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind . . is void," except vwhere ancillary
to the sale of a business or the dissolution of a partnership. Note, 3 A.L.R.2d 522 (1943).
Organized baseball has effectively by-passed these common law and statutory prohibitions
on employment contracts in restraint of trade by relying upon its own extra-judicial en-
forcement of both the covenant not to compete and the reserve clause in the uniform player
contract.
238. See notes 199, 200 supra.
239. Mlarienelli, Ltd. v. United Booking Offices of America, 227 Fed. 165 (S.D.N.Y.
1914) (attempt to monopsonize vaudeville stars' services by booking companies) ("The
necessary inference is that the defendants, if successful, will control all 'first class' per-
formers and succeed in monopolizing the supply. This, in turn, enables them to control
the whole business, and constitutes the very conditions which the Sherman Act means to
prevent." L. Hand, J., id. at 171.); Anderson v. Shipowners' Ass'n of Pacific Coast, 272
U.S. 359 (1926) (monopsony of seamen's services by shipowners).
240. Id. at 363.
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essential for the survival of the baseball industry, or players' salaries be con-
sidered fair and reasonable, the fact that the reserve rule permits prices for
services to be manipulated is enough to render the agreement illegal per se.
Whatever may be the peculiar problems and characteristics of organized base-
ball, the Sherman Act, so far as price-manipulation agreements are concerned,
"establishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries alike." 241
If the reserve rule falls, its instruments of enforcement will fall with it as
methods pursued to accomplish an unlawful object. The uniform player con-
tracts containing the reserve clause, being "the result of a concerted plan or
plot ... to suppress competition .... would come plainly within the terms of
the statute, and, as parts of the scheme or plot, would be unlawful. '" 42
Similarly, the blacklisting of recalcitrant players and the boycotting of "out-
law" clubs appear to be illegal per se, and no showing of reasonableness or
economic necessity could save such practices if challenged. 243
Even if the reserve rule were held lawful as a "reasonable" restraint on
competition and even if contract-jumping or reserve-jumping were actionable
at state law, the boycott and blacklist would appear to remain a per so vio-
lation of the Sherman Act. However laudable the purpose of industrial self-
regulation, the Supreme Court has held that the ends do not justify the use
of such illegal means as a boycott or blacklist.2 44 Neither do the courts con-
done extra-judicial action by an industry against trade abuses. The Fashion
Originators Guild, for example, was found to be an unlawful combination
because it was:
"an extra-governmental agency, which precribes rules for the regu-
lation and restraint of interstate commerce, and provides extra-
judicial tribunals for determination and punishment of violations,
and thus trenches upon the power of the national legislature and vio-
lates the statute. '245
241. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940). "[M]arket
manipulation in its various manifestations is implicitly an artificial stimulus applied to
(or at times a brake on) market prices, a force which distorts those prices, a factor which
prevents the determination of those prices by free competition alone." Id. at 223. The
price-fixing of services was found to be illegal per se in United States v. National Ass'n
of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950). See also Ramsay v. Associated Bill Posters,
260 U.S. 501 (1923); Ring v. Spina, 148 F2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945).
242. United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324, 357-8 (1912). See also Paramount
Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930) (agreement, among ten com-
peting motion picture distributors, to refuse to license their films except by uniform con-
tract which included provisions for boycott of contract violators).
243. Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941);
Anderson v. Shipowners' Ass'n of Pacific Coast, 272 U.S. 359 (1926); Eastern Retail
Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
244. Fashions Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941);
Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 599 (1936). See also United States
v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522-3 (1948).
245. Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465-6 (1941).
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'ertical integration. If the reserve rule and its enforcement methods--
uniform contracts, boycotts, and blacklists-presently violate the Sherman
Act, the farm system, which depends upon these practices, will share the same
fate. However, even if the reserve rule were exempted under the present labor
provisions or a new statute, the further possibility arises that the farm sys-
tern itself may violate the antitrust laws. Vertical integration is not illegal
per se under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. However, when it unreasonably
narrows the outlets to which some can sell and the sources from which others
can buy, it becomes suspect. 240 The Supreme Court has indicated that vertical
integration or an exclusive dealing arrangement is illegal (1) whenever it is
a calculated scheme to gain control over an appreciable segment of the market
and to restrain or suppress competition, rather than an expansion to meet
legitimate business needs; (2) whenever it results in a monopoly which has
the power to exclude competition and the ability to exercise leverage on the
market; or (3) whenever the effect is to restrict unreasonably the opportunity
of competitors to market their products or buy their raw materials.
" T
Each purchase of a minor league subsidiary, each working agreement with
a minor league club, narrows the market for the industry's most essential
factor of production-player contracts. The farm system grooves the player's
opportunity for advancement, enabling the parent club to put major league
prospects in deep freeze in the minor leagues for at least seven years without
risking loss of the player to a competing club. By controlling the sources of
player contracts in the minor leagues, some farm operators have been able
to corner the best in playing talent in their own leagues-notably the St. Louis
Cardinals, New York Yankees, and Brooklyn Dodgers. Clubs unable to afford
large farm systems have been doomed to mediocre teams, poor patronage, and
meager or non-existent profits.
More critical, however, is the effect on the players themselves. There may
be no overriding public interest in the speed with which an inanimate ob-
ject such as a motion picture reel reaches exhibitors with the widest public
market. But such is not true with player contracts. A player's active
career is short, seldom more than ten or fifteen years and hardly ever more
than twenty. Years wasted in poor-paying minor leagues mean income for-
ever lost for the player with major league ability. The major league dubs,
through their exclusive dealing arrangements with minor league affiliates, are
able to channel the sale of player contracts directly to themselves, foreclosing
any access to this market by major league competitors. The effect of this
leverage in the marketing of player contracts is to retard the promotion of
many talented players and thereby deprive them of earnings they could other-
wise obtain by performing for a rival major league club.
246. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 176-7 (1947).
247. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 174 (1948) ; United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 524 (1948).
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Division of consumer imarkets. "Territorial rights"-or the allocation of con-
sumer markets among clubs in organized baseball-appears to be a clear vio-
lation of the Sherman Act. Some of the first antitrust cases ever to reach the
Supreme Court recognized that such agreements restrained competition and
tended to enhance prices to the public. 2 48 Organized baseball is no exception.
Admission prices through the years typify the behavior of monopolistic in-
dustries by their rigidity both in times of depression and inflation.249
The most detrimental results of such territory allocation are not the prices
charged to the public, however. Competition from other spectator amusements
or different forms of recreation prevent the industry from abusing its price
pattern. Rather, the chief abuses of "territorial rights" are their effect on the
quality of the product, on playing competition among rival clubs, and on the
players' salaries. In an industry where equal financial resources have been
a prerequisite for equal competitive opportunity, market areas are frozen so
as to cause mounting disparity between rival clubs. Clubs fortunate enough
to be frozen in the larger markets tend to become stronger with each successive
year, to the benefit of their fans, stockholders, and players. Clubs located in
the smaller cities, however, are doomed to deteriorating teams and declining
attendance, profits, and player salaries.
Exclusion of competitors. The restrictive practices of organized baseball,
viewed together, would also appear to monopolize the industry in violation
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The tactics employed by the combination to
exclude competitors are typical of those found in many early Section 2 cases. 210
The most significant are boycotts and price wars-both designed to prevent
access to the player market by outsiders and to preserve the exhibition mo-
nopoly.
Even without these predatory practices, however, it would appear that or-
ganized baseball is an unlawful monopoly. The legality or illegality of an
industrial combination does not depend on whether it is a "good" or a "bad"
monopoly. Rather it depends on the economic power of the combination.
Where a single corporation or a combination of firms acting in concert so
dominates a market as to be able to fix prices or exclude competitors, the
requisite intent to monopolize is inferred.251 The combination of clubs com-
prising organized baseball exercises arbitrary control over both the purchase
and resale of players' services. By the reserve rule, each club possesses mo-
nopsonistic power to fix the price it pays for the services of players who
produce baseball exhibitions. By virtue of the leverage provided by this con-
trol over the player market, the combination also exercises exclusive control
in the market of selling professional baseball exhibitions.
248. See, e.g., Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
249. HousE REPORT, 97-8.
250. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States
v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
251. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173 (1948) ; American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946); United States v. Aluminum Co,
of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431-2 (1945).
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CONSEQUENCES OF SHERMAN ACT ENFORCEMENT
Atomization-or a forced return to free competition-appears probable if
present litigation runs its course and if Congress remains inactive. Clubs or
players injured by organized baseball's restrictive agreements will be entitled
to obtain treble damages and injunctive relief. z2 Agreements which presently
divide player and consumer markets will become void and unenforceable in any
court.2- '3 To escape recurring suits, organized baseball will have to disorganize.
Thus, the entire rubric of competitive restraints binding together the various
leagues would disappear-the reserve rule, blacklisting, boycotts, and territorial
rights. Only internal league agreements, involving such matters as scheduling
games and dividing revenue, would appear safe from antitrust attack, so long as
they do not unreasonably restrain competition. 25a Such atomization is the pana-
cea recommended by many of the game's critics.21 However, of present alter-
natives it is probably the least feasible, for it is a cure that would kill the
patient.
A professional team sport faces problems unique in the business world. It
is unique because it requires cooperation among competitors in order to pro-
duce a marketable product. Its product is competition, requiring for its crea-
tion a cooperative association of teams with relatively equal playing ability.
Without such competition on the playing field, the public vll not buy its
product at any price.
Professional baseball is often compared with the motion picture industry,
the giant among spectator amusements. True, both Paramount and the Pitts-
burgh Pirates operate and maintain their own plants and have an exhibition to
sell. They both have similar public relations and personnel problems, and both
are dependent upon publicity. But the similarity ends there. Paramount may
hire its employees, produce and market its films, and choose its most advan-
tageous course of business without the necessity of cooperating with its com-
petitors. Each production is a separate venture, requiring no continuity of
performers. The Pittsburgh Pirates, on the other hand, cannot present ex-
hibitions where and when they please; their product requires competitors to
serve as opponents. Neither can they hire whom they please, for their games
will be unattended unless their performers have ability comparable to their
252. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1946).
253. 6 CoRnur, CoNTAcTs § 1382 (1951).
254. Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (191S). Where
a number of league members boycott another member for the purpose of placing it in a
less advantageous competitive position, the rule of reason enunciated by the Chicago
Board of Trade case would not appear to save the scheme. See note 136 snira.
255. See, e.g., Topkis, Monopoly in Professional Sports, 5S Y= LJ. 691, 705-11
(1949) ; 'Moore, The Reserve Clause is; Baseball Contracts, 79 A,,TDUcA 325 (1943);
Ward, Is the Base-ball Player a Chattel?. 40 Lirppwcorr's 310 (18'37); HoU Ern. r,
215-20.
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opponents. Furthermore, they must maintain relative playing equality with
their opponents over extended periods of time, because single exhibitions,
however closely contested, do not maintain public interest unless they are a
part of a larger drama-the quest for a championship.250
Another unique feature in professional baseball is the fact that "psychic
income" is as much a motive guiding management decisions as the profit
motive. Most investors in the game are businessmen who rely on other in-
dustries for financial return.2 5 7 Most of them are in baseball because they
are fans. They want the pleasure which accompanies a championship just as
much as their customers. A few major league owners have lost over a million
dollars chasing pennants.2 5 8 Heedless of financial losses, they bid more for
player talent than expected gate receipts would warrant just to get a winning
team. The presence of one or two such clubs is enough to disrupt an entire
market.25 9 Even some of the most profitable clubs have not been operated to
reward their investors with dividends. The fabulously successful New York
Yankees paid only three dividends in thirty-one years. The two Boston clubs
did not honor their stockholders with as much as a penny for over three
decades.2
60
In the face of such considerations, conventional solutions of free or "work-
able" competition completely break down. Restoration of a free labor market
Nill return the industry to the chaos which ruled in its early years, when
clubs had an average life expectancy of two or three years. Early pioneers
in the industry tried every available alternative in an attempt to keep the
player market open, but nothing short of direct restraints proved capable
256. See HousE REP RT, 86-8, 229.
257. HousE REPORT, 91.
258. Operating losses for Tom Yawkey's Boston Red Sox totaled two million dollars,
1933-50. The St. Louis Browns cost their owners one million dollars, 1928-39. The
Boston Braves lost close to one million dollars during the period, 1923-45. iluNas,
1599-1600. The Braves were reported to have lost a record $600,000 during the 1952
season. Sporting News, Nov. 26, 1952, p. 6, col. 1.
259. In the mid-Thirties, Tom Yawkey, owner of the Boston Red Sox, went on a
contract-buying spree in an attempt to purchase a pennant-winning team. I-IC spent
$250,000 for Shortstop Joe Cronin, $150,000 for Pitcher Lefty Grove, $150,000 for First
Baseman Jimmy Foxx, and lesser amounts for other recognized stars. Enough clubs
were unwilling to sell, however, so that this aggregation of talent never succeeded in
winning a pennant. Sporting News, June 19, 1946, p. 1. Not until Yawkey turned to
the farm system and the free market for rookies did the Red Sox reach their goal, in
1946. In one month in 1952, the Red Sox spent about $100,000 in cash and promised
several times this amount to youngsters who agreed to sign vith the Boston farm
system. Sporting News, July 2, 1952, p. 1, col. 5. Commented Joe Cronin, now the
club's general manager: "[I]t is true that we're all paying more for talent than we
used to. That, of course, is because the kids themselves, operating under the advice of
their managers, have got into the habit of playing one bid against another. The thing
mushrooms and pretty soon the bidding goes higher than common sense dictates." Sport-




of putting the business on a self-paying basis. Championships meant greater
prestige and greater revenue, yet only one club could win the championship
each year. The annual scramble for players saddled clubs with expenses that
only a pennant-winner could hope to meet. To cut the payroll meant a loss
of the club's best players, a poor playing record, declining attendance, and
certain financial loss. To join in the reckless bidding at best only reduced
these losses. For most clubs, the bright hopes of April became disillusion-
ment and deficits by August. Indeed, the number of interested investors
and the number of active professional clubs dwindled during the 1870's to the
point where a quick demise of the industry seemed probable. -%'
Even the players, alleged victims of the reserve rule, generally agree that
restraints on their freedom of contract are necessary if the sport is to be a
successful business which offers them secure employment. 60 2 Their criticisms
have been directed against the abuses which the reserve rule makes possible
-arbitrary salary terms, assignment without consent, blacklisting for joining
independent clubs, and the retarding of their advancement to the major
leagues.2 63 Elimination of the reserve rule would remove these abuses, it
is true. Initially, it might also increase player salaries. But the history of
both professional baseball and other professional team sports indicates that
the honeymoon would be a brief one. Unless the clubs could eliminate com-
petition in the player market, most investors would soon tire of seeing their
savings disappear in the pursuit of player talent and would withdraw from the
industry, leaving the players without employment.
Some club owners in former years suggested that the solution was to com-
bine rival clubs in the same league into one corporation. This would permit
the league to sign all players and allocate them to member clubs so that pen-
nant races would be evenly contested. Competition for players would exist in
leagues bidding against each other for talent. The overriding objection to such
a plan has been the fear that it would wreck the public's faith in the integrity
of baseball games. When a faction of the National League in 1902 proposed
such a reorganization, public disfavor was so pronounced that the plan vas
scuttled.2 8 4
261. See HousE REroRT, 16-22. Even after the formation of organized baseball with
monopsony power over the player market, heavy financial losses recurred whenever com-
petition broke out in the industry. During the Players League v,-ar (lS90) clubs in the
National League and independent Players League lost over '500,000. Id. at 35. In the
first year of the Federal League war (1914), txenty-six clubs in the five largest leagues
reported operating losses reaching $1,250,000. Id. at 56. This experience was duplicated
in professional football when the National Football League and the All-America Con-
ference recklessly competed for the services of football players prior to their recent
amalgamation. See Topkis, Monopoly in Professional Sports, ;S Y=I L.J. 691, 704
(1949).
262. HorsE REPoRT, 208-20.
263. Id. at 139-77, 208-20, passin.
264. Id. at 38, 41. See also id. at 87-8.
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"CARTE BLANCHE" EXEMPTION
Inasmuch as professional baseball cannot survive without some kinds of
competitive restraints, league and club executives have favored carte blanche
exemption from the antitrust laws. Thirty years ago, organized baseball ob-
tained such exemption by Supreme Court edict. 2 5 In the last Congress, friends
of the sport in both the Senate and House of Representatives proposed bills
which would reaffirm what the high court did in 1922. These bills would
exempt all aspects of organized professional sports enterprises from the Sher-
man Act, Clayton Act, and Federal Trade Commission Act.200 The breadth
of these bills evoked immediate censure from the Antitrust Subcommittee, to
which they were referred.2 7 Not only would they exempt individual profes-
sional sports, such as boxing and golf, which have no economic justification
for restraints in the performers' market, 2 8 but they would also give blanket
approval to practices in organized baseball which do not merit special pro-
tection. These bills would sanction restrictive broadcasting agreements, the
exclusion of new enterprises from the industry, the division of consumer
markets, the blacklisting of players who refused to comply with the clubs'
own agreements, and any future restraints of trade which the industry might
devise.269 Although the subcommittee concluded that the preponderance of the
evidence established professional baseball's need for "some sort" of reserve
rule,2 70 it refused to recommend the full immunity the industry desired.2 t
265. Federal Baseball case, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
266. HousE REPORT, 1.
267. See, e.g., HEARINGS, 382-5.
268. Individual professional sports are exhibited on a match-to-match basis, requiring
no team organization, 6ontinuous employment, or cooperation among employers. The
promotor can produce the entire exhibition by himself, hiring both or all of the skilled
performers necessary for the match.
269. See HousE REPoRT, 230. The club owners do not appear to be unanimous in
their desire for antitrust immunity. P. K. Wrigley, majority stockholder and president
of the Chicago Cubs, testified that he personally does not favor complete exemption of
organized baseball. HERAmNGS, 734. Even Senator Edwin C. Johnson, who proposed one
of the bills for carte blanche exemption, seems to have altered his position. Speaking
at the thirtieth annual dinner of the New York baseball writers, in February, 1953, he
said: "Last year, when the Celler Committee explored the possibility of monopoly in
baseball, [we] made tracks to Washington and filled the record with evidence that there
was no monopoly in baseball. We told this committee that baseball was all one big happy
family working together in harmony and understanding to serve America's great public
interest in America's great game. We told them that every one in baseball . . . [was]
treated fairly and with justice. I can only speak for myself, but if the majors indiscrimi-
nately invade the territory of the minors with television as they have with radio, I for
one will testify before Congress and the courts that major league baseball is a cruel
and heartless monopoly motivated by avarice and greed, and woe unto whoever gets in
their path." Sporting News, Feb. 11, 1953, p. 18, col. 1. And see Daley, Cassandra
Speaks, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1953, p. 28, col. 6.
270. HousE REPORT, 229.
271. Id. at 230.
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The wisdom of the Subcommittee's attitude appears obvious. However
unique may be the problems of professional baseball, the seventy-year history
of organized baseball demonstrates that club owners, acting as they should
in their own self-interest, are incapable of providing restraints on their own
behavior which would serve as an adequate substitute for the checks of a free
market. The only practices in organized baseball which merit exemption fro.m
the antitrust laws are those restraints which foster equal playing competition
among league rivals and thus permit the sport to operate as a business. Many
of the industry's time-honored practices do not accomplish this purpose.
The present leaders of professional baseball inherited the existing pattern
of self-regulation from their predecessors. Practices which once were looked
upon as temporary expedients 272 have now become so engrained that the
game's leaders fear losing any one of them would upset the industry. Com-
missioner Frick, for example, told the Antitrust Subcommittee that "terri-
torial rights" was one of the two foundation stones of professional baseball. - a
Branch Rickey, general manager of the Pittsburgh Pirates, testified that the
farm system was the savior of the game. 74
Such claims lack factual foundation. Neither territorial rights nor the farm
system bears any direct relation to the maintenance of playing competition.
In fact, under existing conditions, both institutions tend to thwart that goal.
Clubs living off the cream of the larger metropolitan areas can afford to buy
the contracts of more and better players, hire more and better scouts, and ac-
quire more and better farm dubs, thus tending to create the very unbalanced
playing strength which the reserve rule was intended to eliminate. Clubs less
favorably situated must accept their fate; the rules sharply restrict their
opportunities to move to greener pastures.
The chief beneficiaries of the farm system assert that the minor leagues,
training ground for future major league players, could not survive without
subsidization from big league clubs.2-70 This may be true, but it is no defense
for the status quo. Before vertical integration arose, minor league clubs ob-
tained equivalent subsidization through the prices received from the sale or
draft of player contracts.276 If this no longer suffices to keep them operating,
272. The first protective barriers around "territorial rights," erected by charter
members of the National League in 1876, were "impelled" by the "instinct of preservation"
to put the infant industry "on a sound financial and moral basis." HiFda:.Gs, 1512-3. The
blacklisting of players who ignored organized baseball's monopsony claims and jumped to
independent leagues was justified as a temporary "mar measure" to destroy the Union
Association, "wreckers" of organized baseball. A. G. Mills (president of the National
League, 1883-4), Letter to Editor, Sporting Life, May 31, 1832, original in library,
Baseball Hall of Fame, Cooperstown, N.Y. See also HOUsE RnFonT, 23. According to
Branch Rickey, the inception of the farm system "was occasioned by necessity" to
permit a poor club (St. Louis Cardinals) to survive in major league company. Id. at 63.
273. HEAsINGS, 29; see also HousE RuorT, 190.
274. Id. at 69.
275. See, e.g., id. at 69-70.
276. The share of major league receipts used for the subsidization of the minor
leagues has remained relatively stable at about ten percent over the past forty years.
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other devices such as direct subsidies taken from major league gate, radio, and
television receipts are available to supplement their revenues.27
The only major restraint presently used by organized baseball which merits
congressional approval is the reserve rule, and then only if adequate safe-
guards are present. Depriving a professional entertainer of the right to choose
his employer is an extraordinary exception to make in an economy which relies
on free competition to determine the allocation of human and physical re-
sources. It can be justified only if to do otherwise would destroy the enter-
tainer's livelihood. Moreover, adequate safeguards should be provided which
will prevent abuse by baseball employers of their monopsony power, That
professional baseball players would eventually lose their occupation without
the reserve rule or its equivalent appears clear, both from history and the un-
contradicted testimony before the Antitrust Subcommittee. But that players
now enjoy safeguards which protect them from the potential abuse of the
reserve rule is extremely doubtful.
278
Essential safeguards for players should at least incorporate those devices,
the utility of which organized baseball itself has recognized in the past. These
include player limits, minimum salaries, the draft and waiver rules, and the
prohibition on farming. Vestiges of all these safeguards still survive, indicat-
ing that organized baseball continues at least to render lip-service to their
desirability.
No club should be able to control more players than its immediate playing
needs require. Organized baseball itself recognized this principle seventy-
years ago,279 when it first adopted the reserve rule. Player limits assure re-
served players of a larger share of the club's revenue and free other players
for employment elsewhere. For player replacements, clubs should be able to
draft any promising player from clubs in lower leagues or claim through
waivers any player released by clubs in their own or higher leagues. Both
the draft and waiver rules have been accepted by the industry, in varying
Only the method of subsidization has changed. Forty years ago all of these payments were
for the draft or purchase of minor league players' contracts. They benefited any minor
league club with promising talent. Today most of the payments are to farm clubs,
which constitute only 60 percent of minor league clubs. See Housa REoRT, 108.
277. Senator Edwin C. Johnson, who doubles as president of the Class "A" Western
League, introduced a resolution at the 1952 minor league convention urging the major
leagues to devote all of their radio and television receipts for equitable distribution
among minor league clubs. Sporting News, Dec. 10, 1952, p. 6, col. 1.
278. See HousE REPORT, 139-77.
279. When organized baseball was established in 1883, each club was limited to the
control of eleven players. In the major leagues, this player limit was subsequently
increased to twelve in 1885, fourteen in 1887, and thirty-five in 1912; it has been set at forty
from 1921 to the present time. Major League Rule 2 presently reads "Since the supply
of skilled players is not equal to the demand, no club shall have title to or under
its control at any one time more than 40 'players, exclusive of nonplaying manager,
coaches, and players who have been promulgated as ineligible or voluntarily retired, or




degrees, for over half a century. 0 When universally applied, such rules
permit players to work for the highest-paying league warranted by their
ability, as determined by the collective judgment of all club managers.
In determining priorities for draft or waiver claims, leagues should be classi-
fied according to the salary-paying ability of their member clubs, A-ith leagues
in the highest classifications obtaining first preference. S1 To promote equal
playing competition within each league, draft and waiver priorities should
be awarded, as now, to the league members most in need of new talent.2
Such league classifications should not be rigid. The door should always be
open to new leagues, which would be entitled to the draft and waiver priorities
their salary-paying ability warrants. Likewise, existing leagues should be
promoted or demoted in the player-preference hierarchy as their financial
strength changes, due to population shifts or the shifts of league members to
new market areas. The draft and waiver prices should be nominal or abolished
altogether, if price is not to become a barrier to a player performing for the
highest-paying club which desires his services.2  In addition, players should
be free to reject promotion by the draft if they desire to remain with their
present employers2S4 For good cause, they should also be free to reject as-
signment of their contracts by waivers to a club in a particular locale.
280. The first waiver rule was adopted in 185 "to keep clubs from sending players
to lower or competing leagues without permitting rival clubs to employ such players.
Leagues felt it was in their interest to retain a player in that league if any member
club desired him. . .. Before a club in either major league could assign a player to
the other major league or to a minor league club, it had to secure 'waivers' or promises
from its competitors not to sign the released player. Through trial and error the
National League developed a waiver rule which presumed all clubs waived their claims
to a released player unless they indicated to the contrary." HousE RFro:x, 14'j-9. If a
league rival claimed the released player, it had first option to his services. Subsequently,
waivers were required of all major league clubs before players could be transferred to
the minor leagues. Similar waiver rules now apply in the higher minor leagues. Ibid.
281. This appears to be the theory of the present rule, which bases classification on
the aggregate population of the cities composing each league. National Association
Agreement § 10.02(b), HFnkrIGs, 1195. However, paid attendance, and therefore receipts,
have not paralleled population figures. In 1952, for example, the Class "C" Pioneer
League drew more fans than three of the four Class "A" leagues. NATioIAL Assocu-
TION OF PR0orssio-;AL BASEMU.I. LAGUES, 1952 HiGHGouTs 2 (1952).
282. Preference in draft and waiver selections in the major leagues are presently
given to clubs in reverse order of their league standing in the pennant race. Major
League Rules 5(c), 10(h), Hr.ARMGS, 1130, 1137.
283. Since the adoption of the draft rules, the maximum draft prices have increased
from $1,000 to $15,000. HousE Rmpor, 143-4. In 1907 the majors drafted 117 players
at an average price of $1,124. HousE RE1oar, 145. In 1952 they drafted only eleven
at an average price of $10,909. Sporting News, Dec. 10, 1952, p. 9, col. 1. The prevailing
waiver price in the majors today is $10,000. Major League Rule 10(k), HEn,;cs, 1137.
284. At times minor league players have preferred to stay with their former clubs
rather than be promoted to the major leagues. See, c.g., the cases of Mike Kelley,
Kelley v. Herrmann, 155 Fed. 887 (S.D. Ohio 1906), HousE Rcrom', 46-7; and Al
Vidmar, HEAmINGS, 547.
285. See HouSE REPoRT, 167, 169-70.
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Reasonable player limits, a universal draft, and universal waivers would
automatically eliminate farm systems and in effect restore the farming ban
which once was a part of the baseball code. Ownership of subsidiary clubs
could no longer be utilized as a method of engrossing player talent or retard-
ing the advancement of players in their profession.
Although player limits and the draft and waiver rules are still a part of
organized baseball's code, numerous exceptions have vitiated their effective-
ness. Player limits, which range from twenty-two in the lowest leagues to
forty in the majors, are meaningless inasmuch as there is no limit on the
number of players which a club may control on farm affiliates.280 The
draft covers a small fraction of minor league players. Players are ineligible
for the draft until they have completed from two to five years of service
on minor league clubs. In addition, no more than one player may be drafted
from minor league clubs classified as "A" or higher, and players returned
to the minors on "option assignments" are ineligible for the draft for an
additional three seasons if recalled each fall before the drafting period.2
Players may not be claimed on waivers until they have been in the major
leagues for three years, and requests are revocable if a competing club claims
the contract of the waived player.288 In minor leagues classified as "A"
or higher, waivers are required only from clubs in the league of the releasing
club. In the lower minor leagues, waiver protection is virtually non-exist-
ent.280 The farming prohibition now applies only to the control of players
by secret "gentlemen's agreements," an unnecessary subterfuge today, when
clubs can own minor league subsidiaries or enter written working agree-
ments. 2
0
Players have frequently agitated for rules which would limit the assign-
ment of their contracts without their consent.29  However, the only players
having that opportunity today are players with ten years of major league
experience whose contract a club wishes to assign to the minor leagues 2'
and Pacific Coast League players who may approve non-draft clauses in their
contracts.
2 3
In addition to the above safeguards, a reasonable code might also provide
for minimum salaries, salary arbitration, the drafting of free agents, and the
prohibition of player contract sales. Provision for minimum salaries in all
classifications, with arbitration of salary disputes between a club and its re-
286. Housa REPoRT, 154-6.
287. Id. at 142-6, 158-9.
288. Major League Rules 10(c), 10(i), HEAINGs, 1136-7; see Housa REPORT, 152.
289. National Association Agreement § 23.02, HEARMNGS, 1215; Housp REonT, 147.
290. Major-Minor League Rule 11(k), HEAniNGs, 1168; National Association Agree-
ment § 24.02, HEmNGS, 1217-8; see Housa REPORT, 60, 62-74, 156-9, 177-89.
291. HoUSE REPORT, 165-72.
292. Major League Rule 8(b), Major-Minor League Rule 9, HEA RINS, 1134, 1165.
This concession for veteran major league players was inserted at the request of the
short-lived Ball Players' Fraternity in 1914. HousE REPORT, 168.
293. Major-Minor League Rule 5(g), as amended 1951, HEAmNs 1180-1.
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served player, would prevent clubs from abusing their discretion in fixing
players' salaries.2 94 One danger of the reserve rule is that it tends to siphon
club expenditures to the acquisition of new players through the purchase of
player contracts or the payment of huge bonuses to promising rookies. If
the reserve rule is to accomplish its avowed purpose of equalizing playing
competition, it may be desirable to halt these practices by prohibiting the
transfer of player contracts except by the draft, waivers, and non-cash trades
between clubs of the same classification,2- 5 and by extending the draft to
rookies entering the profession. These changes would eliminate the present
treatment of players as salable chattels and foreclose the opportunity of
wealthy clubs to "buy" pennants.
Could these safeguards be achieved by the unionization of ball players?
Probably not. Professional baseball players are individualists. Even nov,
they bargain individually with their reserving club on salary terms, and they
would oppose any standardization of salaries which collective bargaining might
encourage. The nature of their occupation is such that organization for the
purpose of collective bargaining is not feasible. Ball playing is a calling brief
in duration, migratory and seasonal in character. -3sa Every effort to organize
players in the past has proved a failure.207 Furthermore, public opinion ap-
294. See HousE REroa, 159-65. When organized baseball first adopted the reserve
rule in 1883, all reserved players were assured of a minimum salary. Wfhen the players
recognized the reserve rule in the uniform contract four years later, they insisted that
the club be prohibited from reducing the salary of a reserved player without his consent.
HousE Rm'ouR, 159-60. At the present time, minimum salary safeguards are provided
only for the 400 players active in the major leagues. Such players are guaranteed a salary
at the rate of $5,000 a season so long as they remain in the major leagues. MIfajor League
Rule 17(d), HEAmNGs, 1144.
295. A bill proposed by Rep. LaGuardia (N.Y.) in 1925 virtually would have
accomplished this objective. The LaGuardia bill would have imposed a ninety percent
federal tax on the sale of player contracts whenever the amount involved ex-ceeded
$5,000, unless the player received the purchase price. IR. 12102, 69th Cong., Ist Sess.,
66 Cong. Rec. 2907; New York Times, Feb. 3, 1925, p. 26, col. 2.
296. See AmsaoxG, THE UxIoNIZATo- oF Basm.u.. (unpublished thesis in Prince-
ton University Library, 1947).
297. Aside from completely abortive attempts, four unions have existed for brief
periods in the professional baseball industry. The National Brotherhood of Professional
Baseball Players, recognized by the National League in 1887, found itself incapable of
effecting safeguards to the reserve rule. Terming the National League "stronger than
the strongest trust," it organized its own league in 1890 and expired a year later when
organized baseball forced the Players League out of business. The League Players' Pro-
tective Association, organized in 1900, died quietly in 1902. The Base Ball Players'
Fraternity, organized in 1913, collapsed in 1917 when it called an unsuccessful strike.
The last attempt, the American Baseball Guild, folded within a few months after it
started in 1946. HousE RePror, 32-3, 172-7. The Commissioner was instrumental in
defeating the last attempt to unionize. "We questioned the wisdom of it and the owners
were disturbed. . . .We used one man from my office, who was a former pitcher for
the American Association and Rip Sewell and Jimmie Brown, and they beat the union."
House REIoRT, 175. A complete chronicle of the Guild's fiasco is reported in Amxsmro:.i,
op. cit. supra note 296.
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pears overwhelmingly opposed to unionization of players. 208 If the reserve
rule is to be perpetuated without abuse, the only practical answer appears to
be congressional action.
ALTERNATIVE STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
In order to solve the existing antitrust dilemma facing professional team
sports and the courts, Congress could successfully exempt the reserve rule
from harmful antitrust attack and simultaneously condition such exemption
with safeguards designed to assure industrial flexibility and fairness to the
players. This objective could be accomplished in three ways.
Congress itself conceivably could draft legislation defining in detail the
permissive limits of monopsony power in the professional team sports in-
dustries. The task of foreseeing all possible contingencies and loopholes, how-
ever, would be tremendous. Continued revision would probably be necessary
if Congress were to correct complications which are prone to develop when-
ever statutory regulation supplants private regulation as a check on "natural
monopoly. '2 99
As an alternative, Congress could draft a limited exemption for the reserve
rule, leaving to the courts the problem of determining what safeguards are
reasonable for the protection of clubs' and players' interests. The Antitrust
Subcommittee in 1952 apparently gave serious consideration to this alter-
native. "Such a bill," reported the Subcommittee, "would state in general
terms that the antitrust laws shall not apply to reasonable rules and regulations
which promote [playing] competition among baseball clubs, even though they
restrain competition for players' services-as does the reserve clause-pro-
vided that such rules guarantee players a reasonable opportunity to advance
in their profession and to be paid at a rate commensurate with their ability."80°
Such legislation would, in effect, lay down a "rule of reason" for organized
baseball. It would not, the Subcommittee pointed out hopefully, give "pro-
tection to activities designed to thwart geographic realinement of major league
franchises or to arbitrary blacklisting of players in the course of a 'war'
298. In a nation-wide survey by the Institute of Public Opinion in 1946 the question
was asked, "Would you like to see baseball players join labor unions?" Only 12 percent
said "Yes"; 53 percent answered in the negative; 34 percent said they did not follow
baseball; and one percent had no opinion. Am~STRONG, Op. cit. sMpra note 296, at 67.
But see Gould, Unionism's Bid in Baseball, 115 Nav REPUBLIC 134 (1946).
299. The Antitrust Subcommittee in its final report claimed "neither the requisite
competence nor the desire to draft the intricate code which would be required. Congress
cannot properly, nor should it, enact a comprehensive code to govern every detail of
baseball's business." HousE REPORT, 231. The Subcommittee appears guilty of overstate-
ment. Even if Congress were to drift a detailed code for professional team sports, such
legislation would not "govern every detail" of such industries. The exemption being for
one purpose-sanctioning the reserve rule-the legislation would be concerned only with
a declaration of necessary safeguards to protect this monopsony grant from abuse.
300. House REPORT, 231.
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against an independent league. On the other hand. the reasonable and neces-
sary utilization of the reserve clause would be protected against successful
antitrust attack."8 0 1
Such a course, too, has its disadvantages. Initially it would leave the deter-
mination of reasonableness to the very parties who have frequently abused
that discretion in the past. Because of the burdens and delays of litigation,
judicial review of the industry's rules might be inadequate to serve as an
effective check on any abuse by club owners of their monopsony power. On
the other hand, too frequent resort to the courts might lead to a detailed
supervision by the judiciary.3112 The courts would be handicapped by not
having a full perspective on the industry's problems; each case they reviewed
would involve but one isolated dispute. Disagreement among courts as to
what constitutes reasonable safeguards to the reserve rule might result in ex-
tended uncertainty until a body of "baseball common law" was developed.
A final alternative would be for Congress to assign to a federal administra-
tive agency the responsibility for prescribing reasonable restraints on com-
petition for players' services. An expert federal commission would be better
equipped than Congress to draft and revise necessary safeguards to protect
this grant of monopsony power from being abused. It would also provide
more disinterested rule-making and more efficient administration than court
review of the reasonableness of the club owners' own regulatory agreements.
Its chief drawback appears to be that few persons want it. °3 The Antitrust
301. Ibid.
302. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. S81, S95 (S.D.N.Y.
1949), for similar objections raised by Judge Augustus Hand concerning an injunction
against the motion picture companies.
303. The phobia appears to be common among sports writers and club owners. "An
unthinkable step," reported Arthur Daley, sports columnist in the New York Times. "At
least it will be unthinkable until the Revolution and the Communists take over the Gov-
ermnent." Daley, Hands Off, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1952, p. 3b, col. 3. Red Smith
reported equal alarm from within the ruling circles of organized baseball: "As one of
the game's representatives confided during the hearings in Washington, 'We wanted
no part of this, brother. We didn't ask for the bills or the hearings. But as long as
the situation has been thrust upon us, we hope maybe %ve can get a crust of bread out
of it. Perhaps professional sports could be exempted from the anti-trust laws. However,
if that means Federal regulation of baseball-God forbid l' " Smith, Baseball and State-
craft, N.Y. Herald Tribune, May 23, 1952, p. 20, col. 5.
Ban Johnson, first president of the American League (1900-27), was once "heartily
in favor" of federal control of professional baseball. N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1927, p. 16,
col. 1. See also id., Oct. 7, 1924, p. 17, col. 2; Jan. 15, 1925, p. 17, col. 1; Jan. 16, 1925,
p. 11, col. 6. Senator Estes Kefauver more recently urged the Eame course: "It might
even be the part of wisdom for Congress to establish a Baseball Commission. If this
is done, nothing more than the basic structure of the sport and the powers of the High
Commissioner should be governed. This action would eliminate any danger that owner-
ship might tend to elect its Commissioner with the understanding that he would act
principally as a figurehead for them. The institution of baseball requires discipline of
ownership as well as playing personnel." Kefauver, Bas'ball Escapes the Tcmptcr's
Snare, Baseball Magazine, Oct. 1951, pp. 6, 7.
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Subcommittee summarily concluded that such federal administrative control
"would be unwise in the extreme. '8 0 4
CONCLUSION
The net result of the congressional hearings on organized baseball has been
indecisive. Organized baseball, by asking Congress for a complete exemption
from the antitrust laws, lost at least for the present its opportunity for con-
gressional approval of the reserve rule. The Antitrust Subcommittee, on the
other hand, failed to lift an intolerable burden from the courts. As the age-
old practices surrounding the "baseball trust" come piecemeal before the
federal courts in pending or future treble damage actions, judges will face a
difficult dilemma. If they follow the antitrust laws as presently interpreted
by the Supreme Court, they will eliminate the business foundation of organized
baseball and, in the name of protecting competitive opportunities for the
players, deprive them of a livelihood. On the other hand, if the courts bend
to the temptation of carving their own exemption for the game, as the Supreme
Court did in 1922, they run the risk of vitiating the effectiveness of the anti-
trust laws in endeavors which do not share the unique problems of profes-
sional team sports. They also might thereby sanction restraints on competition
in organized baseball and related sports industries which are both unnecessary
and harmful. The ability of the courts to graft to the antitrust laws sensible
amendments that will affect an entire industry when confronted only with the
pleadings or trial record of two parties is not lightly to be presumed.
The one beneficial outgrowth of the hearings is that, for the first time since
the 1920 Black Sox scandal, organized baseball is indulging in serious efforts
to put its own house in order. Already, the combination has made efforts to
temper the abuses of bonus payments to inexperienced rookies and of the rules
on territorial rights 0 5
304. HouSE REPORT, 231.
305. Following publication of the congressional report, Commissioner Frick appointed
three committees to re-examine the agreements of organized baseball. One committee,
according to the Commissioner, "has come through with its recommendations and the
Executive Council is now recommending changes in our rules and procedure which would,
among other things, strengthen and meet criticism of certain phases of our option rule;
our player control rule; deficiencies in the minor league contract; shortcomings in the
draft rule and would establish definitely the right of player representatives to a vote in
the Executive Council on all matters pertaining to players' contracts and regulations.
"Another Committee . . . has been appointed to study and bring in recommendations
pointing toward the realignment of leagues. This study involving as it does real property
interests, is not one that can be disposed of quickly. This Committee is making certain
recommendations as to changes in the territorial rules, but they will not have their
over-all long range program in shape for consideration for somi time.
"The third Committee .. . was delegated the duty of evolving legislation which
would eliminate to a degree the payment of tremendous bonuses to untried youngsters
and would rather provide a means of paying boys on merit.as they developed in their
profession." Communication from Ford C. Frick to the YALE LAW JoURNAL, dated Oct.
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Even if organized baseball succeeds in ridding itself of all the abuses stem-
ming from its agreements in restraint of trade, Congress and the courts should
not be lured into bestowing continued antitrust immunity. Industrial tyranny,
however benevolent, neither recommends itself to American traditions nor
forebodes to act indefinitely as a faithful public servant. If professional team
sports are "natural monopsonies," the burden rests upon Congress to create
a public check to replace the checks normally expected of a free market. The
ultimate solution, therefore, to the predicament now facing the courts and
organized baseball is legislation which would both exempt the reserve rule
and safeguard it against abuse. Whether Congress itself, the courts, or a
federal agency should determine the necessary safeguards presents a difficult
legislative choice. But it is not nearly so difficult as the present alternatives
now facing the courts-immunization or atomization.
30, 1952, in Yale Law Library. See also Sporting News, Nov. 12, 1952, p. 3, col. 1. The
first steps of this rule revision were taken at the December, 1952, meetings when
organized baseball limited bonuses to free agents to less than $5,000 and the majors
slightly modified their restrictions on club transfers. See notes 109, 126 supra.
